Posté par: igor51 le janvier 27, 2018, 01:01:04
29 April and 27 May, FireEye Labs identified several new Molerats
attacks targeting at least one major U.S. financial institution and
multiple, European government organizations.
we last published details relevant to
activity in August of 2013, we covered a large campaign of
Poison Ivy (PIVY) attacks directed against several targets in the
Middle East and the United States. We felt it was significant to
highlight the previous PIVY campaigns to:
this off-the-shelf Remote Access Tool (RAT) shouldn’t be
automatically linked to Chinese threat actors.
several documented tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and
indicators of compromise (IOC) for identifying Molerats
activity.
this was just one unique facet to a much broader series of related
attacks dating back to as early as October 2011 and are still ongoing.
Previous research has linked these campaigns to Molerats, but with so
much public attention focused on APT threat actors based in China,
it’s easy to lose track of targeted attacks carried out by other
threat actor groups based elsewhere. For example, we recently
published the "
Saffron Rose" whitepaper, detailing a rapidly evolving
Iranian-based threat actor group known as the “Ajax Security Team."
New Attacks, Same Old Tactics
With the reuse of
command and control (CnC) infrastructure and a similar set of TTPs,
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/molerats1.png" width="196"
height="119" />Molerats activity has been tracked and expanded
to a growing target list, which includes:
- Palestinian
and Israeli surveillance targets - Government departments
in Israel, Turkey, Slovenia, Macedonia, New Zealand, Latvia, the
U.S., and the UK - The Office of the Quartet
Representative - The British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) - A major U.S. financial institution
- Multiple
European government organizations
Previous Molerats
campaigns have used several garden-variety, freely available
backdoors such as CyberGate and Bifrost, but, most recently, we have
observed them making use of the PIVY and Xtreme RATs. Previous
campaigns made use of at least one of three observed forged
Microsoft certificates, allowing security researchers to accurately
tie together separate attacks even if the attacks used different
backdoors. There also appears to be a habitual use of lures or decoy
documents – in either English or Arabic-language – with content
focusing on active conflicts in the Middle East. The lures come
packaged with malicious files that drop the Molerats’ flavor of the
week, which happen to all be Xtreme RAT binaries in these most
recent campaigns.
Groundhog Day
On 27 May we observed at least one
victim downloading a malicious .ZIP file as the result of clicking
on a shortened Google URL – http://goo[.]gl[/]AMD3yX – likely
contained inside of a targeted spearphishing email. However, we were
unable to confirm for this particular victim:
style="color: rgb(51,51,51);font-style: normal;line-height: 24.0px;"
alt="molerats2"
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/molerats2.png" width="138"
height="158" />
1) “حصري بالصور لحظة الإعتداء على المشير عبد الفتاح السيسي.scr”
(MD5: a6a839438d35f503dfebc6c5eec4330e)
- Malicious download URL was sent to a well-known European
government organization. - The shortened URL breaks out to
“http://lovegame[.]us/ Photos[.]zip,” which was clicked/downloaded
by the victim. - The extracted binary, “حصري بالصور لحظة
الإعتداء على المشير عبد الفتاح السيسي.scr,” opens up a decoy Word
document and installs/executes the Xtreme RAT binary into a temp
directory, “Documents and Settings\admin\Local
Settings\Temp\Chrome.exe.” - The decoy document, “rotab.doc,”
contains three images (a political cartoon and two edited photos),
all negatively depicting former military chief Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi. - Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “Chrome.exe” (MD5:
a90225a88ee974453b93ee7f0d93b104), which is unsigned. - As
of 29 May, the URL has been clicked 225 times by a variety of
platforms and browser types, so the campaign was likely not
limited to just one victim. - Two of the download referrers
are webmail providers (EIM.ae” and “Sltnet.lk”) further indicating
the malicious URL was likely disseminated via spearphishing
emails.
On 29 April we observed two unique malicious
attachments being sent to two different victims via spearphishing
emails:
2) 8ca915ab1d69a7007237eb83ae37eae5
alt="moleratssss"
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/moleratssss.png"
width="196" height="150" />
- Malicious
file sent to both the financial institution and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs targets. - Drops an Arabic language decoy
document titled “Sisi.doc”, which appears to contain several
copy/pasted excerpts of (now retired) Egyptian Major General
Hossam Sweilem, discussing military strategy and the Muslim
Brotherhood. - The title of the document appears to have
several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the document is
written in Arabic. As noted in our August 2013 blog post, this
could possibly be a poor attempt to frame China-based threat
actors for these attacks. - Xtreme RAT binary dropped:
“sky.exe” (MD5: 2d843b8452b5e48acbbe869e51337993), which is
unsigned.
3) “Too soon to embrace Sisi _ Egypt is an unpredictable
place.scr" (MD5: 7f9c06cd950239841378f74bbacbef60)
- Malicious file only sent to a European government
organization. - Drops an English language decoy document also
titled “Sisi.doc”, however this one appears to be an exact copy of
a 23 April Financial Times’ news article about the uncertainties
surrounding former military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi running for
president in the upcoming Egyptian elections. - Drops the
same Xtreme RAT binary: “sky.exe” (MD5:
2d843b8452b5e48acbbe869e51337993), which is unsigned.
Another attribute regularly exhibited by Molerats malware samples
are that they are often archived inside of self-extracting RAR files
and encoded with EXECryptor V2.2, along with several other
legitimate looking archived files.
Related Samples
Both of the malicious files above have
a compile date/time of 2014-04-17 09:43:29-0000, and, based
on this information, we were able to identify five additional
samples (one sample only contained a lure but no malicious binary),
related to the 29 April attacks. These samples were a little more
interesting, because they contained an array of either attempted
forged or self-signed Authenticode certificates.
All of the
additionally identified samples were sent to one of the same
European government organizations mentioned previously.
4) 2b0f8a8d8249402be0d83aedd9073662
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/molerats5.png"
width="176" height="186" />
- Drops an
Arabic language Word Document titled “list.doc”. - The
title of the document appears to have several Chinese characters,
yet the entire body of the document is written in Arabic. - Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “Download.exe” (MD5:
cff48ff88c81795ee8cebdc3306605d0). This malware is signed with a
self-signed certificate issued by “FireZilla” (see
below).Certificate serial number: {75 dd 9b 14 c6 6e 20 0b 2e 22
95 3a 62 7b 39 19}.
alt="moleratsfirezille"
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/moleratsfirezille.jpg"
width="356" height="184" />
5) 4f170683ae19b5eabcc54a578f2b530b
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/molerats8.png"
width="209" height="200" />
- Drops an
Arabic language Word Document titled “points.doc,” which appears
to be an online clipping from a news article about ongoing
Palestinian reconciliation meetings between Fatah and Hamas in the
Gaza strip. - The title of the document appears to have
several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the document is
written in Arabic. - Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “VBB.exe”
(MD5: 6f9585c8748cd0e7103eab4eda233666). Though the malware
appeared to be signed with a certificate named “Kaspersky Lab”,
the real hash did not match the signed hash (see
below).Certificate serial number: {a7 ed a5 a2 15 c0 d1 91 32 9a
1c a4 b0 53 eb 18}.
(Forged
Kaspersky Lab certificate)
6) 793b7340b7c713e79518776f5710e9dd &
a75281ee9c7c365a776ce8d2b11d28da
src="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/06/redtext.png" width="220"
height="169" />
- Both drop an Arabic language Word
Document titled “qatar.doc,” which appears to be an online
clipping for a new article concerning members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and the ongoing conflicts between Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain – all against
Qatar because of the country’s support for the Muslim
Brotherhood. - The title of the document appears to
have several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the
document is written in Arabic. - Xtreme RAT binary dropped
by the first sample: “AVG.exe” (MD5:
a51da465920589253bf32c6115072909), which is unsigned.
7) Pivoting off one of the fake Authenticode certificates we
were able to identify at least one additional related binary,
“vmware.exe” (MD5: 6be46a719b962792fd8f453914a87d3e), also Xtreme
RAT, but doesn’t appear to have been sent to any of our customers.
The malicious binary is also encoded with EXECryptor V2.2–similar to
the samples above–and the CnC domain has resolved to IPs that
overlap with previously identified Molerats malware.
Indicators of Compromise
Although the samples
above are all Xtreme RAT, all but two samples communicate over
different TCP ports. The port 443 callback listed in the last sample
is also not using actual SSL, but instead, the sample transmits
communications in clear-text – a common tactic employed by
adversaries to try and bypass firewall/proxy rules applying to
communications over traditional web ports. These tactics, among
several others mentioned previously, seem to indicate that Molerats
are not only aware of security researchers’ efforts in trying to
track them but are also attempting to avoid using any obvious,
repeating patterns that could be used to more easily track endpoints
infected with their malware.
Conclusion
Although a large number of attacks against
our customers appear to originate from China, we are tracking
lesser-known actors also targeting the same firms. Molerats
campaigns seem to be limited to only using freely available malware;
however, their growing list of targets and increasingly evolving
techniques in subsequent campaigns are certainly noteworthy.
MD5 Samples
- a6a839438d35f503dfebc6c5eec4330e
- 7f9c06cd950239841378f74bbacbef60
- 8ca915ab1d69a7007237eb83ae37eae5
- 2b0f8a8d8249402be0d83aedd9073662
- 4f170683ae19b5eabcc54a578f2b530b
- 793b7340b7c713e79518776f5710e9dd
- a75281ee9c7c365a776ce8d2b11d28da
- 6be46a719b962792fd8f453914a87d3e
Older Molerats samples from Dec 2013 (not listed above)
- 34c5e6b2a988076035e47d1f74319e86
- 13e351c327579fee7c2b975b17ef377c
- c0488b48d6aabe828a76ae427bd36cf1
- 14d83f01ecf644dc29302b95542c9d35
References & Credits
A special thanks to Ned
Moran and Matt Briggs of FireEye Labs for supporting this
research.
target="_blank">http://cyber-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf
Source: Molerats, Here for Spring! (http://)