FireEye has examined a range of TEMP.Periscope activity revealing
extensive interest in Cambodia's politics, with active compromises of
multiple Cambodian entities related to the country’s electoral system.
This includes compromises of Cambodian government entities charged
with overseeing the elections, as well as the targeting of opposition
figures. This campaign occurs in the run up to the country’s July 29,
2018, general elections. TEMP.Periscope used the same infrastructure
for a range of activity against other more traditional targets,
including the defense industrial base in the United States and a
chemical company based in Europe. Our previous blog post focused on
the group’s href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html">targeting
of engineering and maritime entities in the United States.
Overall, this activity indicates that the group maintains an
extensive intrusion architecture and wide array of malicious tools,
and targets a large victim set, which is in line with typical
Chinese-based APT efforts. We expect this activity to provide the
Chinese government with widespread visibility into Cambodian elections
and government operations. Additionally, this group is clearly able to
run several large-scale intrusions concurrently across a wide range of
victim types.
Our analysis also strengthened our overall attribution of this
group. We observed the toolsets we previously attributed to this
group, their observed targets are in line with past group efforts and
also highly similar to known Chinese APT efforts, and we identified an
IP address originating in Hainan, China that was used to remotely
access and administer a command and control (C2) server.
Active since at least 2013, TEMP.Periscope has primarily focused on
maritime-related targets across multiple verticals, including
engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing,
defense, government offices, and research universities (targeting is
summarized in Figure 1). The group has also targeted
professional/consulting services, high-tech industry, healthcare, and
media/publishing. TEMP.Periscope overlaps in targeting, as well as
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), with TEMP.Jumper, a group
that also overlaps significantly with public reporting by href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets">Proofpoint
and href="https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf">F-Secure
on "NanHaiShu."

Figure 1: Summary of TEMP.Periscope activity
FireEye analyzed files on three open indexes believed to be
controlled by TEMP.Periscope, which yielded insight into the group's
objectives, operational tactics, and a significant amount of technical
attribution/validation. These files were "open indexed" and
thus accessible to anyone on the public internet. This TEMP.Periscope
activity on these servers extends from at least April 2017 to the
present, with the most current operations focusing on Cambodia's
government and elections.
Compromises of Cambodian Election Entities
Analysis of command and control logs on the servers revealed
compromises of multiple Cambodian entities, primarily those relating
to the upcoming July 2018 elections. In addition, a separate spear
phishing email analyzed by FireEye indicates concurrent targeting of
opposition figures within Cambodia by TEMP.Periscope.
Analysis indicated that the following Cambodian government
organizations and individuals were compromised by TEMP.Periscope:
TEMP.Periscope sent a spear phish with AIRBREAK malware to
Monovithya Kem, Deputy Director-General, Public Affairs, Cambodia
National Rescue Party (CNRP), and the daughter of (imprisoned)
Cambodian opposition party leader Kem Sokha (Figure 2). The decoy
document purports to come from LICADHO (a non-governmental
organization [NGO] in Cambodia established in 1992 to promote human
rights). This sample leveraged scsnewstoday[.]com for C2.

Figure 2: Human right protection survey lure
The decoy document "Interview Questions.docx" (MD5:
ba1e5b539c3ae21c756c48a8b5281b7e) is tied to AIRBREAK downloaders of
the same name. The questions reference the opposition Cambodian
National Rescue Party, human rights, and the election (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Interview questions decoy
Infrastructure Also Used for Operations Against Private Companies
The aforementioned malicious infrastructure was also used against
private companies in Asia, Europe and North America. These companies
are in a wide range of industries, including academics, aviation,
chemical, maritime, and technology. A MURKYTOP sample from 2017 and
data contained in a file linked to chemscalere[.]com suggest that a
corporation involved in the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB)
industry, possibly related to maritime research, was compromised. Many
of these compromises are in line with TEMP.Periscope’s previous
activity targeting maritime and defense industries. However, we also
uncovered the compromise of a European chemical company with a
presence in Asia, demonstrating that this group is a threat to
business worldwide, particularly those with ties to Asia.
AIRBREAK Downloaders and Droppers Reveal Lure Indicators
Filenames for AIRBREAK downloaders found on the open indexed sites
also suggest the ongoing targeting of interests associated with Asian
geopolitics. In addition, analysis of AIRBREAK downloader sites
revealed a related server that underscores TEMP.Periscope's interest
in Cambodian politics.
The AIRBREAK downloaders in Table 1 redirect intended victims to the
indicated sites to display a legitimate decoy document while
downloading an AIRBREAK payload from one of the identified C2s. Of
note, the hosting site for the legitimate documents was not
compromised. An additional C2 domain, partyforumseasia[.]com, was
identified as the callback for an AIRBREAK downloader referencing the
Cambodian National Rescue Party.
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iric.gov.kh/LICADHO/Interview-Questions.pdf | [pdf]Interview-Questions.pdf.js (e413b45a04bf5f812912772f4a14650f) | |
iric.gov.kh/LICADHO/Interview-Questions.pdf | [docx]Interview-Questions.docx.js (cf027a4829c9364d40dcab3f14c1f6b7) | |
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