Posté par: igor51 le septembre 19, 2018, 17:00:31
FireEye has been tracking a campaign this year targeting web payment
portals that involves on-premise installations of Click2Gov.
is a web-based, interactive self-service bill-pay software solution
developed by Superion. It includes various modules that allow users to
pay bills associated with various local government services such as
utilities, building permits, and business licenses. In October 2017,
Superion released a statement
suspicious activity had affected a small number of customers. In
mid-June 2018, numerous media reports referenced at least seven
Click2Gov customers that were possibly affected by this campaign.
Since June 2018, additional victims have been identified in public
reporting. A review of public statements by these organizations appear
to confirm compromises associated with Click2Gov.
On June 15, 2018, Superion released a statement describing their
notification to affected customers, work with a third-party
forensic firm (not Mandiant), and deployment of patches to Click2Gov
software and a related third-party component. Superion then concluded
that there was no evidence that it is unsafe to make payments
utilizing Click2Gov on hosted or secure on-premise networks with
recommended patches and configurations.
Mandiant forensically analyzed compromised systems and recovered
malware associated with this campaign, which provided insight into the
capabilities of this new attacker. As of this publication, the
discussed malware families have very low detection rates by antivirus
solutions, as reported by VirusTotal.
Attack Overview
The first stage of the campaign typically started with the attacker
uploading a SJavaWebManage webshell to facilitate interaction with the
compromised Click2Gov webserver. Through interaction with the
webshell, the attacker enabled debug mode in a Click2Gov configuration
file causing the application to write payment card information to
plaintext log files. The attacker then uploaded a tool, which FireEye
refers to as FIREALARM, to the webserver to parse these log files,
retrieve the payment card information, and remove all log entries not
containing error messages. Additionally, the attacker used another
tool, SPOTLIGHT, to intercept payment card information from HTTP
network traffic. The remainder of this blog post dives into the
details of the attacker's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
SJavaWebManage Webshell
It is not known how the attacker compromised the Click2Gov
webservers, but they likely employed an exploit targeting Oracle Web
Logic such as CVE-2017-3248, CVE-2017-3506, or CVE-2017-10271, which
would provide the capability to upload arbitrary files or achieve
remote access. After exploiting the vulnerability, the attacker
uploaded a variant of the
available JavaServer Pages (JSP) webshell SJavaWebManage to
maintain persistence on the webserver. SJavaWebManage requires
authentication to access four specific pages, as depicted in Figure 1,
and will execute commands in the context of the Tomcat service, by
default the Local System account.
Figure 1: Sample SJavaWebManage interface
EnvsInfo: Displays information about the Java runtime, Tomcat
version, and other information about the environment.
FileManager: Provides the ability to browse, upload, download
(original or compressed), edit, delete, and timestomp files.
CMDS: Executes a command using
on a non-Windows system) and returns the response.
DBManage: Interacts with a database by connecting, displaying
database metadata, and executing SQL commands.
The differences between the publicly available webshell and this
variant include variable names that were changed to possibly inhibit
detection, Chinese characters that were changed to English, references
to SjavaWebManage that were deleted, and code to handle updates to the
webshell being removed. Additionally, the variant identified during
the campaign investigation included the ability to manipulate file
timestamps on the server. This functionality is not present in the
public version. The SJavaWebManage webshell provided the attacker a
sufficient interface to easily interact with and manipulate the
compromised hosts.
The attacker would then restart a module in
after editing a Click2Gov XML configuration file. With the
would log plaintext payment card data to the Click2Gov log files with
naming convention Click2GovCX.logYYYY-MM-DD.
FIREALARM
Using interactive commands within the webshell, the attacker
uploaded and executed a datamining utility FireEye tracks as
FIREALARM, which parses through Click2Gov log files to retrieve
payment card data, format the data, and print it to the console.
FIREALARM is a command line tool written in C/C++ that accepts three
numbers as arguments; Year, Month, and Day, represented in a sample
command line as: evil.exe 2018 09 01. From
this example, FIREALARM would attempt to open and parse logs starting
on 2018-09-01 until the present day. If the log files exists,
FIREALARM copies the MAC (Modified, Accessed, Created) times to later
timestomp the corresponding file back to original times. Each log file
is then read line by line and parsed. FIREALARM searches each line for
the following contents and parses the data:
- medium.accountNumber
- medium.cvv2
- medium.expirationDate.year
- medium.expirationDate.month
- medium.firstName
- medium.lastName
- medium.middleInitial
- medium.contact.address1
- medium.contact.address2
- medium.contact.city
- medium.contact.state
- medium.contact.zip.code
This data is formatted and printed to the console. The malware also
searches for lines that contain the text ERROR
-. If this string is found, the utility stores the contents in
a temporary file named
line in the Click2GovCX log file, the temporary file
Click2GovCX log file and the timestamps are replaced to the original,
copied timestamps. The result is that FIREALARM prints payment card
information to the console and removes the payment card data from each
Click2GovCX log file, leaving only the error messages. Finally, the
THN1080.tmp temporary file is deleted.
This process is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: FIREALARM workflow
- Attacker traverses Tor or
other proxy and authenticates to SjavaWebManage. - Attacker
launches cmd prompt via webshell. - Attacker runs FIREALARM
with parameters. - FIREALARM verifies and iterates through
log files, copies MAC times, parses and prints payment card data to
the console, copies error messages to
and timestomps with orginal times.
THN1080.tmp is deleted.
SPOTLIGHT
Later, during attacker access to the compromised system, the
attacker used the webshell to upload a network sniffer FireEye tracks
as SPOTLIGHT. This tool offered the attacker better persistence to the
host and continuous collection of payment card data, ensuring the
mined data would not be lost if Click2GovCX log files were deleted by
an administrator. SPOTLIGHT is also written in C/C++ and may be
installed by command line arguments or run as a service. When run as
a service, its tasks include ensuring that two JSP files exist, and
monitoring and logging network traffic for specific HTTP POST request contents.
SPOTLIGHT accepts two command line arguments:
gplcsvc.exe -i Creates a new service
named gplcsvc with the display name
gplcsvc.exe -u Stops and deletes the
service named gplcsvc
Upon installation, SPOTLIGHT will monitor two paths on the infected
host every hour:
If either file does not exist, the malware Base64 decodes an
embedded SJavaWebManage webshell and writes the same file to either
path. This is the same webshell installed by the attacker during the
initial compromise.
Additionally, SPOTLIGHT starts a socket listener to inspect IPv4 TCP
traffic on port 80 and 7101. According to a Superion installation
checklist, TCP port 7101 is used for application resolution from the
internal network to the Click2Gov webserver. As long as the connection
contents do not begin with GET /, the
malware begins saving a buffer of received packets. The malware
continues saving packet contents to an internal buffer until one of
two conditions occurs – the buffer exceeds the size
string POST
/OnePoint/services/OnePointService. If either of these two
conditions occur, the internal buffer data is searched for the
following tags:
<op:AccountNum>
<op:CSC>
<op:ExpDate>
<op:FirstName>
<op:LastName>
<op:MInitial>
<op:Street1>
<op:Street2>
<op:City>
<op:State>
<op:PostalCode>
The contents between the tags are extracted and formatted with a
`|`, which is used as a separator
character. The formatted data is then Base64 encoded and appended to a
log file at the hard-coded file path:
SJavaWebManage to exfiltrate the Base64 encoded log file containing
payment card data. FireEye has not identified any manipulation of a
compromised host’s SSL configuration settings or redirection of SSL
traffic to an unencrypted port. This process is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: SPOTLIGHT workflow
- SPOTLIGHT verifies
webshell file on an hourly basis, writing SJavaWebManage if
missing. - SPOTLIGHT inspects IPv4 TCP traffic on port 80 or
7101, saving a buffer of received packets. - A user accesses
Click2Gov module to make a payment. - SPOTLIGHT parses
packets for payment card data, Base64 encodes and writes to
opt.log. - Attacker traverses Tor or other proxy and
authenticates to SJavaWebManage and launches File Manager. - Attacker exfiltrates opt.log file.
Attribution
Based on the available campaign information, the attacker doesn’t
align with any financially motivated threat groups currently tracked
by FireEye. The attacker’s understanding of the Click2Gov host
requirements, process logging details, payment card fields, and
internal communications protocols demonstrates an advanced knowledge
of the Click2Gov application. Given the manner in which underground
forums and marketplaces function, it is possible that tool development
could have been contracted to third parties and remote access to
compromised systems could have been achieved by one entity and sold to
another. There is much left to be uncovered about this attacker.
While it is also possible the attack was conducted by a single
individual, FireEye assesses, with moderate confidence, that a team
was likely involved in this campaign based on the following requisite skillsets:
- Ability to locate
Click2Gov installations and identify exploitable
vulnerabilities. - Ability to craft or reuse an exploit to
penetrate the target organization’s network environment. - Basic JSP programming skills.
- Advanced knowledge of
Click2Gov payment processes and software sufficient to develop
moderately sophisticated malware. - Proficient C/C++
programming skills. - General awareness of operational
security. - Ability to monetize stolen payment card
information.
Conclusion
In addition to a regimented patch management program, FireEye
recommends that organizations consider implementing a file integrity
monitoring solution to monitor the static content and code that
generates dynamic content on e-commerce webservers for unexpected
modifications. Another best practice is to ensure any web service
accounts run at least privilege.
Although the TTPs observed in the attack lifecycle are generally
consistent with other financially motivated attack groups tracked by
FireEye, this attacker demonstrated ingenuity in crafting malware
exploiting Click2Gov installations, achieving moderate success.
Although it may transpire in a new form, FireEye anticipates this
threat actor will continue to conduct interactive and financially
motivated attacks.
Detection
FireEye’s Adversary Pursuit Team from Technical Operations &
Reverse Engineering – Advanced Practices works jointly with Mandiant
Consulting and FireEye Labs Advanced Reverse Engineering (FLARE)
during investigations assessed as directly supporting a nation-state
or financial gains intrusions targeting organizations and involving
interactive and focused efforts. The synergy of this relationship
allows FireEye to rapidly identify new activity associated with
currently tracked threat groups, as well as new threat actors,
advanced malware, or TTPs leveraged by threat groups, and quickly
mitigate them across the FireEye enterprise.
FireEye detects the malware documented in this blog post as the following:
- FE_Tool_Win32_FIREALARM_1
- FE_Trojan_Win64_SPOTLIGHT_1
- FE_Webshell_JSP_SJavaWebManage_1
- Webshell.JSP.SJavaWebManage
Indicators of Compromise (MD5)
SJavaWebManage
- 91eaca79943c972cb2ca7ee0e462922c
- 80f8a487314a9573ab7f9cb232ab1642
- cc155b8cd261a6ed33f264e710ce300e (Publicly available
version)
FIREALARM
- e2c2d8bad36ac3e446797c485ce8b394
SPOTLIGHT
- d70068de37d39a7a01699c99cdb7fa2b
- 1300d1f87b73d953e20e25fdf8373c85
- 3bca4c659138e769157f49942824b61f
Source: Click It Up: Targeting Local Government Payment Portals (http://)