Posté par: igor51 le mars 04, 2019, 16:00:16
FireEye is highlighting a cyber espionage operation targeting crucial
technologies and traditional intelligence targets from a China-nexus
state sponsored actor we call APT40. The actor has conducted
operations since at least 2013 in support of China’s naval
modernization effort. The group has specifically targeted engineering,
transportation, and the defense industry, especially where these
sectors overlap with maritime technologies. More recently, we have
also observed specific targeting of countries strategically important
to the Belt and Road Initiative including Cambodia, Belgium, Germany,
Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland,
the United States, and the United Kingdom. This China-nexus cyber
espionage group was previously reported as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.
Mission
In December 2016, China’s People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) seized
a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) operating in the South
China Sea. The incident paralleled China’s actions in cyberspace;
within a year APT40 was observed masquerading as a UUV manufacturer,
and targeting universities engaged in naval research. That incident
was one of many carried out to acquire advanced technology to support
the development of Chinese naval capabilities. We believe APT40’s
emphasis on maritime issues and naval technology ultimately support
China’s ambition to establish a blue-water navy.
In addition to its maritime focus, APT40 engages in broader regional
targeting against traditional intelligence targets, especially
organizations with operations in Southeast Asia or involved in South
China Sea disputes. Most recently, this has included
with connections to elections in Southeast Asia, which is likely
driven by events affecting China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China’s
“One Belt, One Road” (一带一路) or “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) is a
$1 trillion USD endeavor to build land and maritime trade routes
across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa to develop a trade
network that will project China’s influence across the greater region.
Figure 1: Countries and industries
targeted. Countries include the United States, United Kingdom,
Norway, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia and Indonesia
Attribution
We assess with moderate confidence that APT40 is a state-sponsored
Chinese cyber espionage operation. The actor’s targeting is consistent
with Chinese state interests and there are multiple technical
artifacts indicating the actor is based in China. Analysis of the
operational times of the group’s activities indicates that it is
probably centered around China Standard Time (UTC +8). In addition,
multiple APT40 command and control (C2) domains were initially
registered by China based domain resellers and had Whois records with
Chinese location information, suggesting a China based infrastructure
procurement process.
APT40 has also used multiple Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
located in China to conduct its operations. In one instance, a log
file recovered from an open indexed server (link to previous blog)
revealed that an IP address (112.66.188.28) located in Hainan, China
had been used to administer the command and control node that was
communicating with malware on victim machines. All of the logins to
this C2 were from computers configured with Chinese language settings.
Attack Lifecycle
Initial Compromise
APT40 has been observed leveraging a variety of techniques for
initial compromise, including web server exploitation, phishing
campaigns delivering publicly available and custom backdoors, and
strategic web compromises.
- APT40 relies heavily on
web shells for an initial foothold into an organization. Depending
on placement, a web shell can provide continued access to victims'
environments, re-infect victim systems, and facilitate lateral
movement. - The operation’s spear-phishing emails typically
leverage malicious attachments, although Google Drive links have
also been observed. - APT40 leverages exploits in their
phishing operations, often weaponizing vulnerabilities within days
of their disclosure. Observed vulnerabilities include:
Figure 2: APT40 attack lifecycle
Establish Foothold
APT40 uses a variety of malware and tools to establish a foothold,
many of which are either publicly available or used by other threat
groups. In some cases, the group has used executables with code
signing certificates to avoid detection.
- First-stage backdoors
such as AIRBREAK, FRESHAIR, and BEACON are used before downloading
other payloads. - PHOTO, BADFLICK, and CHINA CHOPPER are
among the most frequently observed backdoors used by APT40. - APT40 will often target VPN and remote desktop credentials to
establish a foothold in a targeted environment. This methodology
proves to be ideal as once these credentials are obtained, they may
not need to rely as heavily on malware to continue the mission.
Escalate Privileges
APT40 uses a mix of custom and publicly available credential
harvesting tools to escalate privileges and dump password hashes.
- APT40 leverages custom
credential theft utilities such as HOMEFRY, a password
dumper/cracker used alongside the AIRBREAK and BADFLICK
backdoors. - Additionally, the Windows Sysinternals ProcDump
utility and Windows Credential Editor (WCE) are believed to be used
during intrusions as well.
Internal Reconnaissance
APT40 uses compromised credentials to log on to other connected
systems and conduct reconnaissance. The group also leverages RDP, SSH,
legitimate software within the victim environment, an array of native
Windows capabilities, publicly available tools, as well as custom
scripts to facilitate internal reconnaissance.
- APT40 used MURKYSHELL at
a compromised victim organization to port scan IP addresses and
conduct network enumeration. - APT40 frequently uses native
Windows commands, such as net.exe, to conduct internal
reconnaissance of a victim’s environment. - Web shells are
heavily relied on for nearly all stages of the attack lifecycle.
Internal web servers are often not configured with the same security
controls as public-facing counterparts, making them more vulnerable
to exploitation by APT40 and similarly sophisticated groups.
Lateral Movement
APT40 uses many methods for lateral movement throughout an
environment, including custom scripts, web shells, a variety of
tunnelers, as well as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). For each new
system compromised, the group usually executes malware, performs
additional reconnaissance, and steals data.
- APT40 also uses native
Windows utilities such as at.exe (a task scheduler) and net.exe (a
network resources management tool) for lateral movement. - Publicly available tunneling tools are leveraged alongside
distinct malware unique to the operation. - Although MURKYTOP
is primarily a command-line reconnaissance tool, it can also be used
for lateral movement. - APT40 also uses publicly available
brute-forcing tools and a custom utility called DISHCLOTH to attack
different protocols and services.
Maintain Presence
APT40 primarily uses backdoors, including web shells, to maintain
presence within a victim environment. These tools enable continued
control of key systems in the targeted network.
- APT40 strongly favors web
shells for maintaining presence, especially publicly available
tools. - Tools used during the Establish Foothold phase also
continue to be used in the Maintain Presence phase; this includes
AIRBREAK and PHOTO. - Some APT40 malware tools can evade
typical network detectiona by leveraging legitimate websites, such
as GitHub, Google, and Pastebin for initial C2 communications. - Common TCP ports 80 and 443 are used to blend in with routine
network traffic.
Complete Mission
Completing missions typically involves gathering and transferring
information out of the target network, which may involve moving files
through multiple systems before reaching the destination. APT40 has
been observed consolidating files acquired from victim networks and
using the archival tool rar.exe to compress and encrypt the data
before exfiltration. We have also observed APT40 develop tools such as
PAPERPUSH to aid in the effectiveness of their data targeting and theft.
Outlook and Implications
Despite increased public attention, APT40 continues to conduct cyber
espionage operations following a regular tempo, and we anticipate
their operations will continue through at least the near and medium
term. Based on APT40’s broadening into election-related targets in
2017, we assess with moderate confidence that the group’s future
targeting will affect additional sectors beyond maritime, driven by
events such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In particular, as
individual Belt and Road projects unfold, we are likely to see
continued activity by APT40 which extends against the project’s
regional opponents.
Source: APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor (http://)