Posté par: igor51 le avril 30, 2019, 16:00:16
FireEye has observed the certificate most recently being
served on the following IPs (Table 4):
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104.193.252.151:443 | vds2.system-host[.]net | 2019-04-26T14:49:12 |
185.180.196.35:443 | customer.clientshostname[.]com | 2019-04-24T07:44:30 |
213.227.155.8:443 | 2019-04-24T04:33:52 | |
94.156.133.69:443 | 2018-11-15T10:27:07 | |
185.174.172.241:443 | vds9992.hyperhost[.]name | 2019-04-27T13:24:36 |
109.230.199.227:443 | 2019-04-27T13:24:36 |
Table 4: Recent Test Company certificate use
While these IPs have not been observed in any CARBANAK activity,
this may be an indication of a common developer or a shared toolkit
used for testing various malware. Several of these IPs have been
observed hosting Cobalt Strike BEACON payloads and METERPRETER
listeners. Virtual Private Server (VPS) IPs may change hands
frequently and additional malicious activity hosted on these IPs, even
in close time proximity, may not be associated with the same users.
I also parsed an unprotected private key from the source code dump.
Figure 4 and Table 5 show the private key parameters at a glance and
in detail, respectively.
Figure 4: Parsed 512-bit private key
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bType | 7 |
bVersion | 2 |
aiKeyAlg | 0xA400 |
Magic | RSA2 |
Bitlen | 512 |
PubExp | 65537 |
Modulus | 0B CA 8A 20 5D 54 03 02 EA A8 15 46 9F 3E 14 57 F5 1F D0 B7 27 42 0E D1 |
P | 8B 01 8F 7D 1D E0 05 FA D0 35 B2 BF |
Q | 81 69 AB 3D D7 9A 3B 83 EC 2F F1 F7 |
Dp | B5 C7 AE 0F 9E 2B 0E 57 F3 DB |
Dq | 81 AC 0D 20 C3 9D 66 C9 2E 0A |
Iq | C2 D2 55 32 24 76 09 2B 56 71 |
D | 01 6A F3 FA 6A 7C 68 28 70 4D FB 6A 2A 0F FB 39 13 BD 1B 46 6A 2F A3 BD B3 E5 D6 85 98 4D 1C 06 |
Table 5: Private key parameters
I found a value named PUBLIC_KEY defined
in a configuration header, with comments indicating it was for
debugging purposes. The parsed values are shown in Table 6.
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|
bType | 6 |
bVersion | 2 |
aiKeyAlg | 0xA400 |
Magic | RSA1 |
Bitlen | 512 |
PubExp | 65537 |
Modulus | 0B CA 8A 20 5D 54 03 02 EA A8 15 46 9F 3E 14 57 F5 1F D0 B7 27 42 0E D1 |
Table 6: Key parameters for PUBLIC_KEY defined
in configuration header
Network Based Indicators
The source code and binaries contained multiple Network-Based
Indicators (NBIs) having significant overlap with CARBANAK backdoor
activity and FIN7 operations previously observed and documented by
FireEye. Table 7 shows these indicators along with the associated
FireEye public documentation. This includes the status of each NBI as
it was encountered (active in source code, commented out, or compiled
into a binary). Domain names are de-fanged to prevent accidental
resolution or interaction by browsers, chat clients, etc.
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comixed[.]org | ||
194.146.180[.]40 | ||
aaaabbbbccccc[.]org | valign="top"> | |
stats10-google[.]com | ||
192.168.0[.]100:700 | valign="top"> | |
80.84.49[.]50:443 | ||
52.11.125[.]44:443 | ||
85.25.84[.]223 | ||
qwqreererwere[.]com | valign="top"> | |
akamai-technologies[.]org | Commented out | |
192.168.0[.]100:700 | valign="top"> | |
37.1.212[.]100:700 | ||
188.138.98[.]105:710 | ||
hhklhlkhkjhjkjk[.]org | Compiled | |
192.168.0[.]100:700 | valign="top"> | |
| valign="top"> | Compiled | |
193.203.48[.]23:800 |
|
Table 7: NBIs and prevously observed activity
Four of these TCP endpoints (80.84.49[.]50:443, 52.11.125[.]44:443,
85.25.84[.]223, and 37.1.212[.]100:700) were new to me, although some
have been
Conclusion
Our analysis of this source code dump confirmed it was CARBANAK and
turned up a few new and interesting data points. We were able to
notify vendors about disclosures that specifically targeted their
security suites. The previously documented NBIs, Windows API function
resolution, backdoor command hash values, usage of Windows cabinet
file APIs, and other artifacts associated with CARBANAK all match, and
as they say, if the shoe fits, wear it. Interestingly though, the
project itself isn’t called CARBANAK or even Anunak as the information
security community has come to call it based on the string artifacts
found within the malware. The authors mainly refer to the malware as
“bot” in the Visual Studio project, filenames, source code comments,
output binaries, user interfaces, and manuals.
The breadth and depth of this analysis was a departure from the
usual requests we receive on the FLARE team. The journey included
learning some Russian, searching through a hundred thousand of lines
of code for new information, and analyzing a few dozen binaries. In
the end, I’m thankful I had the opportunity to take this request.
In the
post, Tom Bennett takes the reins to provide a retrospective on
his and Barry Vengerik’s
analysis in light of the source code.
Four of CARBANAK Week is available as well.
Source: CARBANAK Week Part Two: Continuing the CARBANAK Source Code Analysis (http://)