The Syrian Electronic Army has made news for its
attacks on major communications websites,
and an alleged attack on
While these attacks garnered public attention, the activities of
another group - The Syrian Malware Team - have gone largely unnoticed.
The group’s activities prompted us to take a closer look. We
discovered this group using a .NET based RAT called BlackWorm to
infiltrate their targets.
The Syrian Malware Team is largely pro-Syrian government, as seen in
one of their banners featuring Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Based
on the sentiments publicly expressed by this group it is likely that
they are either directly or indirectly involved with the Syrian
government. Further certain members of the Syrian Malware Team have
ties to the Syrian Electronic army (SEA) known to be
the Syrian government. This indicates that the Syrian Malware
Team may also be possibly an offshoot or part of the SEA.
Banner used by the Syrian Malware Team
We found at least two distinct versions of the BlackWorm tool,
including an original/private version (v0.3.0) and the Dark Edition
(v2.1). The original
builder was co-authored by Naser Al Mutairi from Kuwait, better
known by his online moniker 'njq8'. He is also
to have coded njw0rm,
and earlier versions of
We found his code being used in a slew of other RATs such as Fallaga
and Spygate. BlackWorm v0.3.0 was also co-authored by another actor,
Black Mafia.
About section within the original
version of BlackWorm builder
Within the underground development forums, it’s common for threat
actors to collaborate on toolsets. Some write the base tools that
other attackers can use; others modify and enhance existing tools.
The BlackWorm builder v2.1 is a prime example of actors modifying
and enhancing current RATs. After njq8 and Black Mafia created the
original builder, another author, Black.Hacker, enhanced its feature set.
About section within BlackWorm Dark
Edition builder
Black.Hacker's banner on social media
As an interesting side note, 'njq8' took down his blog in recent
months and announced a cease in all malware development activity on
his Twitter and Facebook account, urging others to stop as well. This
is likely a direct result of the
filed against him by Microsoft.
The builder for BlackWorm v0.3.0 is fairly simple and allows for
very quick payload, but doesn’t allow any configuration other than the
IP address for command and control (C2).
Building binary through BlackWorm v0.3.0
BlackWorm v0.3.0 controller
BlackWorm v0.3.0 supports the following commands between the
controller and the implant:
| ping | valign="top">Checks if victim is online |
| closeserver | valign="top">Exits the implant |
| restartserver | valign="top">Restarts the implant |
| sendfile | valign="top">Transfer and run file from server |
| download | valign="top">Download and run file from URL |
| ddos | valign="top">Ping flood target |
| msgbox | valign="top">Message interaction with victim |
| down | valign="top">Kill critical windows processes |
| blocker | valign="top">Block specified website by pointing resolution to |
| logoff | valign="top">Logout out of windows |
| restart | valign="top">Restart system |
| shutdown | valign="top">Shutdown system |
| more | valign="top">Disable task manager, registry tools, system |
| hror | valign="top">Displays a startling flash video |
In addition to the features supported by the command structure, the
payload can:
The Syrian Malware Team primarily uses another version of BlackWorm
called the Dark Edition (v2.1). BlackWorm v2.1 was released on a
prolific underground forum where information and code is often shared,
traded and sold.
BlackWorm v2.1 has the same abilities as the original version and
additional functionality, including bypassing UAC, disabling host
firewalls and spreading over network shares. Unlike its predecessor,
it also allows for granular control of the features available within
the RAT. These additional controls allow the RAT user to enable and
disable features as needed. Binary output can be also be generated in
multiple formats, such as .exe, .src and .dll.
BlackWorm Dark Edition builder
We observed activity from the Syrian Malware Team going as far back
as Jan. 1, 2011. Based on Facebook posts, they are allegedly directly
or indirectly involved with the Syrian government. Their Facebook page
shows they are still very active, with a post as recent as July
16th, 2014.
Syrian Malware Team’s Facebook page
The Syrian Malware Team has been involved in everything from
profiling targets to orchestrating attacks themselves. There are
seemingly multiple members, including:
Partial list of self-proclaimed Syrian
Malware Team members
Some of these people have posted malware-related items on Facebook.
Facebook posting of virus scanning of files
While looking for Dark Edition samples, we discovered a binary named
svchost.exe (MD5: 015c51e11e314ff99b1487d92a1ba09b). We
quickly saw indicators that it was created by BlackWorm Dark Edition.
Configuration options within code
The malware communicated out to 178.44.115.196, over port 5050, with
a command structure of:
When looking at samples of Dark Edition BlackWorm being used by the
Syrian Malware Team, the strings “Syrian Malware,” or “
Malware Team” are often used in the C2 communications or within
the binary strings.
Additional pivoting off of svchost.exe brought us to three
additional samples apparently built with BlackWorm Dark Edition.
E.exe, (MD5: a8cf815c3800202d448d035300985dc7) a binary that drew our
attention, looked to be a backdoor with the Syrian Malware strings
within it.
When executed, the binary beacons to aliallosh.sytes.net on port
1177. This C2 has been seen in multiple malware runs often associated
with Syria. The command structure of the binary is:
!0/j|n\Syrian
Malware/j|n\{Hostname}/j|n\{Username}/j|n\USA/j|n\Win 7 Professional
SP1 x86/j|n\No/j|n
\0.1/j|n\/j|n\{ActiveWindowName}/j|n\[endof]
Finally, pivoting to another sample, 1gpj.srcRania
(MD5:f99c15c62a5d981ffac5fdb611e13095), the same strings were present.
The string "Rania" used as a lure was in Arabic and likely
refers to the prolific
Rania of Jordan.
The traffic is nearly identical to the other samples we identified
and tied to the Syrian Malware Team.
!1/j|n\C:\Documents and
Settings\{Username}\Local Settings\Application DataldoDrZdpkK.jpg -
Windows Internet Explorer[endof]!0/j|n\Syrian
Malware/j|n\{Hostname}/j|n\{Username}/j|n\USA/j|n\Win XP
ProfessionalSP2 x86/j|n\No/j|n\0.1/j|n\/j|n\C:\Documents and
Settings\{Username}\Local Settings\Application DataldoDrZdpkK.jpg - {ActiveWindowName}/j|n\[endof]
Determining which groups use which malware is often very difficult.
Connecting the dots between actors and malware typically involves
looking at binary code, identifying related malware examples
associated with those binaries, and reviewing infection vectors, among
other things.
This blog presents a prime example of the process of attribution. We
connected a builder with malware samples and the actors/developers
behind these attacks. This type of attribution is key to creating
actionable threat intelligence to help proactively protect organizations.
