Posté par: igor51 le mai 30, 2019, 16:00:19
This year, Canada, multiple European nations, and others will host
high profile elections. The topic of cyber-enabled threats disrupting
and targeting elections has become an increasing area of awareness for
governments and citizens globally. To develop solutions and security
programs to counter cyber threats to elections, it is important to
begin with properly categorizing the threat. In this post, we’ll
explore the various threats to elections FireEye has observed and
provide a framework for organizations to sort these activities.
The Election Ecosystem: Targets
Historically, FireEye has observed targeting of a wide range of
organizations connected to elections. In considering their role and
criticality to the process of elections, these various entities can be
grouped into three categories: core election infrastructure,
supporting organizations involved in the administration of elections,
and other groups that have a participatory role in the electoral
process. All of these entities may be targeted for a variety of
reasons to influence or collect intelligence on the electoral process
and participants.
FireEye is aware of only limited indications of entities targeted in
the first category (light blue area). Although we have not observed
direct evidence that actors have manipulated the electoral process in
any major national or regional election by infiltrating the systems or
hardware used to record or tally votes, the sheer complexity of these
systems prevents us from categorically stating that these systems have
not been successfully compromised.
Moving outward into the gray section of the diagram, entities that
fall into this category include organizations involved in the
administration of elections. While these organizations may maintain
networks separate from voting systems and tabulation platforms, they
play important roles in overseeing and communicating results to the
public. FireEye has witnessed breaches into a variety of these
organizations, in some cases for the purpose of collecting
intelligence or in others to coopt and display false information on
publicly-facing systems as part of an influence campaign.
Lastly, FireEye has observed targeting of organizations that are
involved in election campaigns and news coverage. Tactics we have
witnessed include disinformation campaigns on adversary-maintained
infrastructure and social media platforms. For example, in August
2017, we observed several inauthentic news websites created to mimic
legitimate local and international media organizations ahead of a
sub-Saharan African nation’s presidential election. A subset of the
counterfeit domains appears to have been created in coordination with
each other, if not by the same actor, to damage the reputation of the
presidential nominee for the opposition party.
The Threat Activity
To counter and mitigate risks to elections, properly categorizing
the specific activity and intent is important. While terms like
“election interference” are often used to describe all of the threats
in this space, some of the malicious activity FireEye has witnessed
may fall outside this definition. Broadly speaking most
election-related threats can be thought of in four categories:
social-media enabled disinformation, cyber espionage, “hack and leak”
campaigns, and attacks on critical election infrastructure.
Social-Media Enabled Disinformation: This category
includes the activity FireEye has tracked from the Russia-affiliated
Internet Research Association (IRA) and various
disinformation operations. In some cases, this has involved
creating fraudulent content on controversial issues and seeking to
promote it across social media platforms. In other examples,
disinformation campaigns have focused on amplifying already issues
that have organic interest. Some of these campaigns may also be
involved in politically-motivated messaging on social media
platforms prior to elections without a specific focus electoral
events.
Cyber Espionage: Nation state actors like Russia-nexus
APT28 and Sandworm Team, and China-nexus APT40, have carried out
cyber espionage operations against multiple types of targets in the
election ecosystem. This has ranged from intrusions into everything
from political campaigns to election commissions, likely for a
variety of reasons. In some cases, these actors are possibly seeking
to obtain information on policy stances of candidates and political
parties. In other situations—particularly against election
administrators or system vendors—it is possible that these
intrusions are reconnaissance for further operations, seeking to
understand network layouts that may allow them to move into more
critical infrastructure.
“Hack and Leak” Campaigns: Some threat actors that
FireEye has observed have utilized the data they’ve gained from
espionage intrusions to then leak that information with the intent
of influencing public perception. In this manner, they combine the
previous two categories of activity. Notably, this tactic has been
employed by Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks in the 2016 U.S. election. In
some cases, similar tactics have leveraged compromised
infrastructure to carry out disinformation operations, such as in
the 2014 Ukrainian presidential campaign in which Russian-nexus
actors posted erroneous election results from the compromised
Ukrainian election commission website.
Attacks on Critical Election Infrastructure
: Compromises into core critical infrastructure such
as election management systems, voting systems, electronic
pollbooks, and others represent the most critical risks to
elections, with the potential to alter or delete votes or voters
from voter rolls. Though this is an often-discussed risk, there is
limited evidence of intrusion activity targeting core election
infrastructure.
Of the activity described here, FireEye has observed a full spectrum
of campaigns by Russian-nexus actors, from carrying out intrusions
into organizations and stealing data, leaking that data through online
personas and fronts, as well as targeting of election infrastructure.
From limited observations, China has for the most part focused solely
on cyber espionage operations, as in the case of activity FireEye
reported on in the targeting the
Cambodian election. From various motivations, FireEye has also
witnessed limited evidence of activity from hacktivists and criminal
entities in targeting parts of the election ecosystem.
Conclusion
While there is increasing global awareness of threats to elections,
election administrators and others continue to face challenges in
ensuring the integrity of the vote. To properly counter threats to
elections, individuals and organizations involved in the electoral
process should:
Learn the Playbook of the Adversary: Proactive organizations
can learn from the activity of threat actors uncovered in other
elections and implement security controls that adapt to new tools
and TTPs. Political campaigns and others should also educate staff
and contractors on common spear-phishing tactics used by some of the
primary APT groups.
Incorporate Threat Intelligence for Context: Operationally,
security organizations can utilize threat intelligence to better
differentiate and triage the most important alerts from untargeted
commodity malware activity.
Anticipate External Threats: Beyond the internal networks of
county governments and political campaigns, election administrators
and risk management professionals involved in elections should
prepare plans for dealing with leaked and compromised data,
understanding how threat actors may utilize this for disinformation
campaigns.
Source: Framing the Problem: Cyber Threats and Elections (http://)