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Forum Security-X => News => Discussion démarrée par: igor51 le août 22, 2019, 14:04:26

Titre: [FireEye]#TweetBlog: APT29, Phishing and the Challenges of Attribution
Posté par: igor51 le août 22, 2019, 14:04:26

#TweetBlog: APT29, Phishing and the Challenges of Attribution

FireEye researchers, analysts and incident responders frequently
  share information and engage with the security community on Twitter
  and other social media platforms. Sometimes this information adds so
  much to ongoing discussions that we feel it is important to share on
  our blogs.

 

Recently, we detected     href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html">intrusion
    attempts against multiple industries as part of a phishing
  campaign that we suspect is being carried out by APT29. Following the
  release of our blog post, one of the authors and the head skeptic,
  Andrew Thompson (@QW5kcmV3), took to Twitter to discuss various
  attribution possibilities that were considered along the way, as well
  as some of the challenges that come with attribution.

 

 

As promised, I'm going to share some of the hypotheses we
    considered. It would be challenging to capture all of the many
    hypotheses discussed, to include a U.S. government threat emulation,
    which was quickly ruled out due to the illegal compromise of third
    parties. Here we go.   href="https://t.co/5kqyzQQeTY">https://t.co/5kqyzQQeTY

—
  Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064649362578370560?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

H1. APT29 conducted the phishing campaign. They
    intentionally used the same virtual machine or builder to create the
    weaponized LNK as they did in 2016 with the intent of causing doubt
    and dissent within the security community. 1/X

— Andrew
  (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064650284935172096?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

The nation-state suspected to be associated with APT29
    has a long history of leveraging deception, which at times includes
    revealing actual truth in such a way as to cause doubt amongst
    analysts. 2/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064650481622892544?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

The primary evidence to support the intentional flagrant
    operations security violation consisted of our collective experience
    responding to APT29 activity, the assumption that APT29 is
    sophisticated enough to understand metadata... 3/X

— Andrew
  (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064650747533357056?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

and the historical body of knowledge regarding the
    suspected nation-state's use of these types of techniques in other
    types of operations. 4/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064651062299131905?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

Furthermore, we can see how effective this ploy was
    initially, and we can certainly anticipate there will continue to be
    researchers alleging a False Flag deception operation has been
    conducted. 5/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064651247217606657?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

While we considered all reasonable hypotheses, we could
    not support a False Flag hypothesis with more than the re-use of the
    LNK. We also determined there were certain overlaps that are not
    publicly known, that would require additional insight into previous
    APT29 intrusions. 6/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064651641104687104?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

At this time, we assessed this would require more effort
    than is warranted to conduct deniable operations in this
    environment. This concludes my summary of my leading hypothesis.
    Additional hypotheses considered follow. 7/7

— Andrew
  (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064651955119710209?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

H2. APT29 conducted the phishing campaign. They used the
    same virtual machine without regard for OPSEC consequences. An
    assumed to be sophisticated actor with a long history of advanced
    tradecraft made a mistake. They possibly did not feel the risk
    warranted due diligence. 1/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064652963585507329?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

The actor did take enough measures to defeat some
    security measures, and they certainly used custom configurations to
    prevent default detection. This is well discussed in the blog. This
    indicates they cared---enough, as long as they found some success.
  2/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064653594928984064?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

Given APT29's history of transitioning from the implant
    they use during initial compromise, it is reasonable to believe they
    could lull us to sleep by allowing us to quickly catch some of their
    early phase activities knowing they only need minutes on a box to
    transition. 3/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064654197155495937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

After initial detection, we launched a Community
    Protection Event (CPE) and put serious resources behind getting
    after the problem. We felt great. You probably saw some of our
    celebratory tweets. It was too easy. Why was it too easy? This was
    the leading question throughout. 4/4

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064654693811376128?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

This concludes my thoughts about Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis
    3 follows.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064654862044917760?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

H3. A presently unidentified threat actor projected to be
    APT29. An actor could feasibly conduct an attack emulating APT29. It
    is technically feasible. We demonstrated how it could be done.
  1/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064655150034219008?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

However, even though it is technically possible, we
    determined other non-technical operational aspects of the campaign
    led us away from this hypothesis fairly quickly. 2/X

— Andrew
  (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064655516045996032?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

An actor could mimic all publicly known aspects of
    previous APT29 activity, but what was notable is their display of
    non-publicly known aspects of past intrusions. It is true that an
    actor with an espionage capability, could learn this information.
  3/X

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064655948063531009?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

However, we had no evidence to support the idea that an
    actor stole intrusion data in order to project as APT29. False-flag
    dominates the deception discussion in this space. What was less
    discussed are more common forms of deception that are actually
    employed by these actors. 4/4

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064656518090416130?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

Some forms of deception we considered but were unable to
    conclude due to our understanding that we only have a slice of the
    visibility into the entirety of the operation are below.

—
  Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064656909809020928?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

Depending on what we learn about the entire scope of the
    phishing campaign, beyond our customers, we may be able to detect
    the masking of targets. This is a technique employed by the
    nation-state suspected to be associated with APT29.

— Andrew
  (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064657497825443840?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

We explored the possibility that some of the links
    delivered may have been something other than Cobalt Strike. We know
    benign zips were delivered to researchers using improper HTTP
    headers. There were seemingly unique URLs for each 'target,' so it
    is possible. We didn't see it.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064657861442072576?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

We generally accepted Cobalt Strike, no matter how
    custom, would not enable an actor long term access to a target
    environment. This was of little concern to us, given our
    understanding, specifically     href="https://twitter.com/matthewdunwoody?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@matthewdunwoody's
    in the trenches experience watching APT29 transition implants.

—
  Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064658240221265921?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

Attribution is hard, especially when we're faced with so
    many things that contradict our perceptions. We expect APT29 to
    be...different. Who is to say they didn't just execute a
    sophisticated operation? They very well did, and we only know what
    we were shown.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064659066524291073?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

One thing I can say with certainty, our early detection
    was a significant advantage. I do not know if they anticipated how
    fast 'we' would be able to detect their modified Pandora C2 profile.
    Fast detection and response, and a solid operational timeline made
    the difference.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064659486286073856?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

The Cobalt Strike server was established approximately 30
    days prior to the first identified emails being sent. That was
    interesting for me, as I'm used to groups, like APT34, executing
    against a target within five days of infrastructure establishment.
    This helps tell the story.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064660343027167233?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

We were not the first ones to go live with a blog with
    regards to this activity. We were comfortable operating with the
    understanding that it was probably APT29, and frankly, if it is
    not---consider they should be mimicking APT29 enough that our
    playbook should be useful.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064660760641466368?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

 

 

I mentioned we have an obligation to our customers first,
    and I believe that. Attribution can take a long time to do right.
    We're not even slapping the table on definitive attribution as of
    today. However, we assembled a team of experts to aggressively get
    after the intrusion.

— Andrew (@QW5kcmV3)     href="https://twitter.com/QW5kcmV3/status/1064661101944565762?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November
    19, 2018

Source: #TweetBlog: APT29, Phishing and the Challenges of Attribution (http://)