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Forum Security-X => News => Discussion démarrée par: igor51 le juillet 26, 2020, 04:01:03

Titre: [FireEye]Think Fast: Time Between Disclosure, Patch Release and Vulnerability Exploitation — Intelligence for Vulnerability Management, Part Two
Posté par: igor51 le juillet 26, 2020, 04:01:03
Think Fast: Time Between Disclosure, Patch Release and Vulnerability
Exploitation — Intelligence for Vulnerability Management, Part Two



  One of the critical strategic and tactical roles that cyber threat
    intelligence (CTI) plays is in the tracking, analysis, and
    prioritization of software vulnerabilities that could potentially
    put an organization’s data, employees and customers at risk. In this
    four-part blog series,       href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/mandiant/threat-intelligence.html">FireEye
      Mandiant Threat Intelligence highlights the value of CTI in
    enabling vulnerability management, and unveils new research into the
    latest threats, trends and recommendations. Check out our first post
    on       href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/blog/threat-research/2020/04/zero-day-exploitation-demonstrates-access-to-money-not-skill.html">zero-day vulnerabilities.


 

Attackers are in a constant race to exploit newly discovered
  vulnerabilities before defenders have a chance to respond. FireEye
  Mandiant Threat Intelligence research into vulnerabilities exploited
  in 2018 and 2019 suggests that the majority of exploitation in the
  wild occurs before patch issuance or within a few days of a patch
  becoming available.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/vulnmanage2/Picture1.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 1: Percentage of vulnerabilities
    exploited at various times in relation to patch release


 

FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence analyzed 60 vulnerabilities
  that were either exploited or assigned a CVE number between Q1 2018 to
  Q3 2019. The majority of vulnerabilities were exploited as zero-days –
  before a patch was available. More than a quarter were exploited
  within one month after the patch date. Figure 2 illustrates the number
  of days between when a patch was made available and the first observed
  exploitation date for each vulnerability.


 

We believe these numbers to be conservative estimates, as we relied
  on the first reported exploitation of a vulnerability linked to a
  specific date. Frequently, first exploitation dates are not publicly
  disclosed. It is also likely that in some cases exploitation occurred
  without being discovered before researchers recorded exploitation
  attached to a certain date.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/vulnmanage2/Picture2.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 2: Time between vulnerability
    exploitation and patch issuance


 

­­­Time Between Disclosure and Patch Release


 

The average time between disclosure and patch availability was
  approximately 9 days. This average is slightly inflated by
  vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-0863, a Microsoft Windows server
  vulnerability, which was disclosed in December 2018 and not patched
  until 5 months later in May 2019. The majority of these
  vulnerabilities, however, were patched quickly after disclosure. In
  59% of cases, a patch was released on the same day the vulnerability
  was disclosed. These metrics, in combination with the observed
  swiftness of adversary exploitation activity, highlight the importance
  of responsible disclosure, as it may provide defenders with the slim
  window needed to successfully patch vulnerable systems.


 


  Exploitation After Patch Release


 

While the majority of the observed vulnerabilities were zero-days,
  42 percent of vulnerabilities were exploited after a patch had been
  released. For these non-zero-day vulnerabilities, there was a very
  small window (often only hours or a few days) between when the patch
  was released and the first observed instance of attacker exploitation.
  Table 1 provides some insight into the race between attackers
  attempting to exploit vulnerable software and organizations attempting
  to deploy the patch.


 
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     


          Time to Exploit for Vulnerabilities First Exploited after a
        Patch

Hours

          valign="top">

Two vulnerabilities were successfully
          exploited within hours of a patch release, CVE-2018-2628 and
        CVE-2018-7602.

Days

          valign="top">

12 percent of vulnerabilities were exploited
          within the first week following the patch release.

One Month

          valign="top">

15 percent of vulnerabilities were exploited
          after one week but within one month of patch release.


     

Years

          valign="top">

In multiple cases, such as the first observed
          exploitation of CVE-2010-1871 and CVE-2012-0874 in 2019,
          attackers exploited vulnerabilities for which a patch had been
          made available many years prior.


 


  Table 1: Exploitation timing for patched
    vulnerabilities ranges from within hours of patch issuance to years
    after initial disclosure


 

Case Studies


 

We continue to observe espionage and financially motivated groups
  quickly leveraging publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in their
  operations. The following examples demonstrate the speed with which
  sophisticated groups are able to incorporate vulnerabilities into
  their toolsets following public disclosure and the fact that multiple
  disparate groups have repeatedly leveraged the same vulnerabilities in
  independent campaigns. Successful operations by these types of groups
  are likely to have a high potential impact.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/vulnmanage2/Picture3.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 3: Timeline of activity for CVE-2018-15982


 

CVE-2018-15982: A use after free vulnerability in a file package in
  Adobe Flash Player 31.0.0.153 and earlier that, when exploited, allows
  an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability was
  exploited by espionage groups—Russia's APT28 and North Korea's
  APT37—as well as TEMP.MetaStrike and other financially motivated attackers.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/vulnmanage2/Picture4.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 4: Timeline of activity for CVE-2018-20250


 

CVE-2018-20250: A path traversal vulnerability exists within the ACE
  format in the archiver tool WinRAR versions 5.61 and earlier that,
  when exploited, allows an attacker to locally execute arbitrary code.
  This vulnerability was exploited by multiple espionage groups,
  including Chinese, North Korean, and Russian, groups, as well as
  Iranian groups APT33 and TEMP.Zagros.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/vulnmanage2/Picture5.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 5: Timeline of Activity for CVE-2018-4878


 

CVE-2018-4878: A use after free vulnerability exists within the
  DRMManager’s “initialize” call in Adobe Flash Player 28.0.0.137 and
  earlier that, when exploited, allows an attacker to remotely execute
  arbitrary code. Mandiant Intelligence confirmed that North Korea’s
  APT37 exploited this vulnerability as a zero-day as early as September
  3, 2017. Within 8 days of disclosure, we observed Russia’s APT28 also
  leverage this vulnerability, with financially motivated attackers and
  North Korea’s TEMP.Hermit also using within approximately a month of disclosure.


 

Availability of PoC or Exploit Code


 

The availability of POC or exploit code on its own does not always
  increase the probability or speed of exploitation. However, we believe
  that POC code likely hastens exploitation attempts for vulnerabilities
  that do not require user interaction. For vulnerabilities that have
  already been exploited, the subsequent introduction of publicly
  available exploit or POC code indicates malicious actor interest and
  makes exploitation accessible to a wider range of attackers. There
  were a number of cases in which certain vulnerabilities were exploited
  on a large scale within 48 hours of PoC or exploit code availability
  (Table 2).


 
   
     
   
              width="144">

Medium


   
              width="144">

High


   
              width="152">

CVE-2018-0296

        width="144">

Medium


   
              width="144">

High


   
              width="152">

CVE-2018-0101

        width="144">

High


   
     
   
     
   
              width="144">

Medium


   
     
       


          Time Between PoC or Exploit Code Publication and First
            Observed Potential Exploitation Events


          Product


          CVE


          FireEye Risk Rating

1 day

WinRAR


     

CVE-2018-20250

1 day

Drupal


     

CVE-2018-7600

1 day

Cisco
          Adaptive Security Appliance

2 days

Apache
        Struts

CVE-2018-11776

2 days

Cisco
          Adaptive Security Appliance

2 days

Oracle
          WebLogic Server

CVE-2018-2893


     

High

2 days

Microsoft
          Windows Server

CVE-2018-8440


     

Medium

2 days

Drupal


     

CVE-2019-6340

2 days

Atlassian
        Confluence

CVE-2019-3396

High


 


  Table 2: Vulnerabilities exploited within two
    days of either PoC or exploit code being made publicly available, Q1
    2018–Q3 2019


 

Trends by Targeted Products


 

FireEye judges that malicious actors are likely to most frequently
  leverage vulnerabilities based on a variety of factors that influence
  the utility of different vulnerabilities to their specific operations.
  For instance, we believe that attackers are most likely to target the
  most widely used products (see Figure 6). Attackers almost certainly
  also consider the cost and availability of an exploit for a specific
  vulnerability, the perceived success rate based on the delivery
  method, security measures introduced by vendors, and user awareness
  around certain products.


 

The majority of observed vulnerabilities were for Microsoft
  products, likely due to the ubiquity of Microsoft offerings. In
  particular, vulnerabilities in software such as Microsoft Office Suite
  may be appealing to malicious actors based on the utility of email
  attached documents as initial infection vectors in phishing campaigns.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/vulnmanage2/Picture6.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 6: Exploited vulnerabilities by
    vendor, Q1 2018–Q3 2019


 

Outlook and Implications


 

The speed with which attackers exploit patched vulnerabilities
  emphasizes the importance of patching as quickly as possible. With the
  sheer quantity of vulnerabilities disclosed each year, however, it can
  be difficult for organizations with limited resources and business
  constraints to implement an effective strategy for prioritizing the
  most dangerous vulnerabilities. In upcoming blog posts, FireEye
  Mandiant Threat Intelligence describes our approach to vulnerability
  risk rating as well as strategies for making informed and realistic
  patch management decisions in more detail.


 

We recommend using this exploitation trend information to better
  prioritize patching schedules in combination with other factors, such
  as known active threats to an organization's industry and geopolitical
  context, the availability of exploit and PoC code, commonly impacted
  vendors, and how widely software is deployed in an organization's
  environment may help to mitigate the risk of a large portion of
  malicious activity.


 

Register today to hear FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence experts
  discuss the latest in     href="https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/7451/392772">vulnerability
    threats, trends and recommendations in our upcoming April 30 webinar.


Source: Think Fast: Time Between Disclosure, Patch Release and Vulnerability
Exploitation — Intelligence for Vulnerability Management, Part Two (http://)