Auteur Sujet: [FireEye]Social Engineering Based on Stimulus Bill and COVID-19 Financial Compensation Schemes Expected to Grow in Coming Weeks  (Lu 3074 fois)

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Social Engineering Based on Stimulus Bill and COVID-19 Financial
Compensation Schemes Expected to Grow in Coming Weeks


Given the community interest and media coverage surrounding the
  economic stimulus bill currently being considered by the United States
  House of Representatives, we anticipate attackers will increasingly
  leverage lures tailored to the new stimulus bill and related recovery
  efforts such as stimulus checks, unemployment compensation and small
  business loans. Although campaigns employing themes relevant to these
  matters are only beginning to be adopted by threat actors, we expect
  future campaigns—primarily those perpetrated by financially motivated
  threat actors—to incorporate these themes in proportion to the media’s
  coverage of these topics.


 

Threat actors with varying motivations are actively exploiting the
  current pandemic and public fear of the coronavirus and COVID-19. This
  is consistent with our expectations; malicious actors are typically
  quick to adapt their social engineering lures to exploit major
  flashpoints along with other recurrent events (e.g. holidays,
  Olympics). Security researchers at FireEye and     href="https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1240442939421200390">in the
    broader community have already begun to identify and report on
  COVID-19 themed campaigns with grant, payment, or economic recovered
  themed emails and attachments.


 

Example Malware Distribution Campaign


 

On March 18, individuals at corporations across a broad set of
  industries and geographies received emails with the subject line
  “COVID-19 Payment” intended to distribute the SILENTNIGHT banking
  malware (also referred to by others as Zloader). Despite the
  campaign’s broad distribution, a plurality of associated messages were
  sent to organizations based in Canada. Interestingly, although the
  content of these emails was somewhat generic, they were sometimes
  customized to reference a payment made in currency relevant to the
  recipient’s geography and contextually relevant government officials
  (Figure 1 and Figure 2). These emails were sent from a large pool of
  different @gmx.com email addresses and had password protected
  Microsoft Word document attachments using the file name “COVID 19
  Relief.doc” (Figure 3). The emails appear to be auto generated and
  follow the format
  <name>.<name><SevenNumberString>@gmx.com. When these
  documents were opened and macros enabled, they would drop and execute
  a .JSE script crafted to download and execute an instance of
  SILENTNIGHT from http://209.141.54[.]161/crypt18.dll.


 

An analyzed sample of SILENTNIGHT downloaded from this URL had an
  MD5 hash of 9e616a1757cf1d40689f34d867dd742e, employed the RC4 key
  'q23Cud3xsNf3', and was associated with the SILENTNIGHT botnet
  'PLSPAM'. This botnet has been seen loading configuration files
  containing primarily U.S.- and Canada financial institution webinject
  targets. Furthermore, this sample was configured to connect to the
  following controller infrastructure:


 
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork4[.]com/post.php

  •  
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork5[.]com/post.php

  •  
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork6[.]com/post.php

  •  
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork7[.]com/post.php

  •  
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork8[.]com/post.php

  •  
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork9[.]com/post.php

  •  
  • http://marchadvertisingnetwork10[.]com/post.php

 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/stimulusphishing/Picture1.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 1: Example lure using CAD


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/stimulusphishing/Picture2.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 2: Example lure using AUD


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/stimulusphishing/Picture3.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 3: Malicious Word document


 

Example Phishing Campaign


 

Individuals at financial services organizations in the United States
  were sent emails with the subject line “Internal Guidance for
  Businesses Grant and loans in response to respond to COVID-19” (Figure
  4). These emails had OpenDocument Presentation (.ODP) format
  attachments that, when opened in Microsoft PowerPoint or OpenOffice
  Impress, display a U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) themed
  message (Figure 5) and an in-line link that redirects to an Office 365
  phishing kit (Figure 6) hosted at https://tyuy56df-kind-giraffe-ok.mybluemix[.]net/.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/stimulusphishing/Picture4.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 4: Email lure referencing business
    grants and loans


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/stimulusphishing/Picture5.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 5: SBA-themed message


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/stimulusphishing/Picture6.png" alt="" />
 
 Figure 6: Office 365 phishing page


 

Implications


 

Malicious actors have always exploited users’ sense of urgency,
  fear, goodwill and mistrust to enhance their operations. The threat
  actors exploiting this crisis are not new, they are simply taking
  advantage of a particularly overtaxed target set that is urgently
  seeking new information. Users who are aware of this dynamic, and who
  approach any new information with cautious skepticism will be
  especially prepared to meet this challenge.


Source: Social Engineering Based on Stimulus Bill and COVID-19 Financial
Compensation Schemes Expected to Grow in Coming Weeks

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