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Zero-Day Exploitation Increasingly Demonstrates Access to Money, Rather
than Skill — Intelligence for Vulnerability Management, Part One



  One of the critical strategic and tactical roles that cyber threat
    intelligence (CTI) plays is in the tracking, analysis, and
    prioritization of software vulnerabilities that could potentially
    put an organization’s data, employees and customers at risk. In this
    four-part blog series,       href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/mandiant/threat-intelligence.html">FireEye
      Mandiant Threat Intelligence highlights the value of CTI in
    enabling vulnerability management, and unveils new research into the
    latest threats, trends and recommendations.


 

FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence documented more zero-days
  exploited in 2019 than any of the previous three years. While not
  every instance of zero-day exploitation can be attributed to a tracked
  group, we noted that a wider range of tracked actors appear to have
  gained access to these capabilities. Furthermore, we noted a
  significant increase over time in the number of zero-days leveraged by
  groups suspected to be customers of companies that supply offensive
  cyber capabilities, as well as an increase in zero-days used against
  targets in the Middle East, and/or by groups with suspected ties to
  this region. Going forward, we are likely to see a greater variety of
  actors using zero-days, especially as private vendors continue feeding
  the demand for offensive cyber weapons.


 

Zero-Day Usage by Country and Group


 

Since late 2017, FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence noted a
  significant increase in the number of zero-days leveraged by groups
  that are known or suspected to be customers of private companies that
  supply offensive cyber tools and services. Additionally, we observed
  an increase in zero-days leveraged against targets in the Middle East,
  and/or by groups with suspected ties to this region.


 


      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/images/intelvuln1/Picture1.png" alt="" />


 

Examples include:


 
  • A group described by researchers as       href="https://citizenlab.ca/2016/05/stealth-falcon/"
          title="https://citizenlab.ca/2016/05/stealth-falcon/">Stealth
          Falcon and       href="https://www.securityweek.com/windows-zero-day-exploited-fruityarmor-sandcat-threat-groups"
        title="https://www.securityweek.com/windows-zero-day-exploited-fruityarmor-sandcat-threat-groups">FruityArmor is
        an espionage group that has reportedly       href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/09/09/backdoor-stealth-falcon-group/">targeted
          journalists and activists in the Middle East. In 2016, this
        group used malware sold by NSO group, which leveraged three iOS
        zero-days. From 2016 to 2019, this group used more zero-days than
        any other group.
  • The activity dubbed SandCat in open
        sources, suspected to be linked to       href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec">Uzbekistan
          state intelligence, has been observed using zero-days in
        operations against targets in the Middle East. This group may have
        acquired their zero-days by purchasing malware from private
        companies such as NSO group, as the zero-days used in SandCat
        operations were also used in Stealth Falcon operations, and it is
        unlikely that these distinct activity sets independently discovered
        the same three zero-days.
  • Throughout 2016 and 2017,
        activity referred to in open sources as     href="https://www.securityweek.com/middle-east-group-uses-flash-zero-day-deliver-spyware">BlackOasis,
        which also primarily targets entities in the Middle East and likely
        acquired at least one zero-day in the past from       href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/">private
          company Gamma Group, demonstrated similarly frequent access to
        zero-day vulnerabilities.

 

We also noted examples of zero-day exploitation that have not been
  attributed to tracked groups but that appear to have been leveraged in
  tools provided by private offensive security companies, for instance:


 
  • In 2019, a zero-day exploit in WhatsApp (CVE-2019-3568) was       href="https://www.itpro.co.uk/spyware/33632/whatsapp-call-hack-installs-spyware-on-users-phones">reportedly
          used to distribute spyware developed by NSO group, an Israeli
        software company.
  • FireEye analyzed activity targeting a
        Russian healthcare organization that leveraged a 2018 Adobe Flash
        zero-day (CVE-2018-15982) that may be linked to leaked source code
        of Hacking Team.
  • Android zero-day vulnerability
        CVE-2019-2215 was       href="https://thehackernews.com/2019/10/android-kernel-vulnerability.html">reportedly
          being exploited in the wild in October 2019 by NSO Group
      tools.

 


  Zero-Day Exploitation by Major Cyber Powers


 

We have continued to see exploitation of zero days by espionage
  groups of major cyber powers.


 
  • According to researchers, the Chinese espionage group APT3
        exploited CVE-2019-0703 in       href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/buckeye-windows-zero-day-exploit">targeted
          attacks in 2016.
  • FireEye observed North Korean group
        APT37 conduct a 2017 campaign that leveraged Adobe Flash
        vulnerability CVE-2018-4878. This group has also demonstrated an
        increased capacity to quickly exploit vulnerabilities shortly after
        they have been disclosed.
  • From December 2017 to January
        2018, we observed multiple Chinese groups leveraging CVE-2018-0802
        in a campaign targeting multiple industries throughout Europe,
        Russia, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. At least three out of six
        samples were used before the patch for this vulnerability was
      issued.
  • In 2017, Russian groups       href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/blog/threat-research/2017/05/eps-processing-zero-days.html">APT28
          and Turla leveraged multiple zero-days in Microsoft Office
      products. 

 

In addition, we believe that some of the most dangerous state
  sponsored intrusion sets are increasingly demonstrating the ability to
  quickly exploit vulnerabilities that have been made public. In
  multiple cases, groups linked to these countries have been able to
  weaponize vulnerabilities and incorporate them into their operations,
  aiming to take advantage of the window between disclosure and patch application. 


 


  Zero-Day Use by Financially Motivated Actors


 

Financially motivated groups have and continue to     href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html">leverage
    zero-days in their operations, though with less frequency than
  espionage groups.


 

In May 2019, we reported that FIN6 used a Windows server 2019
  use-after-free zero-day (CVE-2019-0859) in a targeted intrusion in
  February 2019. Some evidence suggests that the group may have used the
  exploit since August 2018. While open sources have suggested that the
  group potentially acquired the zero-day from criminal underground
  actor "  href="https://www.ibtimes.com/hacker-selling-windows-zero-days-worlds-most-dangerous-hacker-groups-2789374">BuggiCorp,"
  we have not identified direct evidence linking this actor to this
  exploit's development or sale.


 

Conclusion


 

We surmise that access to zero-day capabilities is becoming
  increasingly commodified based on the proportion of zero-days
  exploited in the wild by suspected customers of private companies.
  Possible reasons for this include:


 
  • Private companies are likely creating and supplying a larger
        proportion of zero-days than they have in the past, resulting in a
        concentration of zero-day capabilities among highly resourced
      groups.
  • Private companies may be increasingly providing
        offensive capabilities to groups with lower overall capability
        and/or groups with less concern for operational security, which
        makes it more likely that usage of zero-days will be observed.

 

It is likely that state groups will continue to support internal
  exploit discovery and development; however, the availability of
  zero-days through private companies may offer a more attractive option
  than relying on domestic solutions or underground markets. As a
  result, we expect that the number of adversaries demonstrating access
  to these kinds of vulnerabilities will almost certainly increase and
  will do so at a faster rate than the growth of their overall offensive
  cyber capabilities—provided they have the ability and will to spend
  the necessary funds.


 

Register today to hear FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence experts
  discuss the latest in     href="https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/7451/392772">vulnerability
    threats, trends and recommendations in our upcoming April 30 webinar. 


 


  Sourcing Note: Some vulnerabilities and zero-days were identified
    based on FireEye research, Mandiant breach investigation findings,
    and other technical collections. This paper also references
    vulnerabilities and zero-days discussed in open sources including 

        href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lkNJ0uQwbeC1ZTRrxdtuPLCIl7mlUreoKfSIgajnSyY/view#gid=1123292625">Google
      Project Zero's zero-day "In the Wild" Spreadsheet

  . While we believe these sources are reliable as used in this
    paper, we do not vouch for the complete findings of those sources.
    Due to the ongoing discovery of past incidents, we expect that this
    research will remain dynamic.


Source: Zero-Day Exploitation Increasingly Demonstrates Access to Money, Rather
than Skill — Intelligence for Vulnerability Management, Part One

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