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[FireEye]Amazon Same Day Credential Shipping
« le: mars 25, 2017, 20:00:47 »
Amazon Same Day Credential Shipping

FireEye has identified a campaign involving phishing websites that
  appear as legitimate Amazon sites. Amazon is the largest online
  retailer and threat actors frequently target its customers. In this
  attack, a person browsing the internet would be directed to authentic
  looking – yet fake – Amazon webpages that request a variety of
  information, including Amazon credentials, home address and payment
  card data. Any information entered into the phishing websites could be
  sent to the attackers and potentially used to make fraudulent charges
  and commit other crimes.


 

FireEye detected this phishing campaign through our email MPS
  platform and has seen attacks primarily targeting Amazon customers in
  the U.S., Canada and Europe. FireEye has made Amazon.com aware of this
  phishing campaign. In addition to aggressively investigating all     href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201127830">suspicious
    email reports, Amazon.com provides resources for customers to     href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=15835501">identify
    whether an email is from Amazon.com and to     href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201127790">protect
    their systems.


 

While there have been numerous reports on Amazon phishing attacks in
  the past, this campaign is particularly interesting for security
  analysts because of the evasion techniques being used by the
  attackers. Though various instances of this phishing practice have
  been previously used, we’ve been following this particular campaign
  variant since June 21, 2016. Some of the evasion techniques used in
  this campaign include:


 
  • The phishing page sitting in a legitimate domain, leveraging
        the good reputation of the compromised (non-Amazon) site.

  •    
  • The campaign being browser-aware in terms of the URL it displays
        in the browser.
  • The use of numerical HTML encoding of
        Unicode Characters.
  • IP-based evasion, URL path
        randomization and redirection to an endpoint host to ensure the
        final phishing URL is always unique.

 
Phishing Template Presentation and Techniques

 

After clicking the initial URL, the user is redirected to the
  phishing template page hosted on another compromised site. The
  campaign is browser-aware in terms of the URL it displays in the
  browser.  Hexadecimal encoded domains are displayed when Firefox or
  Safari are used while clear text is displayed in Chrome. An example
  rendering is shown in Figure 1.


 


 


 


  Figure 1. Initial Phishing Page


 

To the user, the page appears to be a legitimate Amazon login page.
  Behind the scenes, however, numerical HTML encoding of Unicode
  characters are prevalent throughout the page serving up the fake
  Amazon login page, as shown in Figure 2. This tactic helps to evade
  text-based detections.


 


 
  Figure 2. Numerical HTML encoding of Unicode
    Characters in the Amazon phishing page.


 
Redirection Analysis and Evasion Techniques

 

The malicious actor behind this phishing campaign regularly updated
  connect.php on the initial compromised host. The purpose of the
  initial host is to redirect users to infected machines hosting
  phishing sites where the phishing template page has been uploaded. As
  these endpoint phishing sites get taken down, a new one is established
  and the redirection page is modified to point to the new phishing page location.


 

Figure 3 shows an example of a complete redirection chain.


 


 


 


  Figure 3. Redirection Chain example


 

After the initial redirection to the second URL in the chain, the
  first thing the server does is include an anti-detection module. This
  anti-detection module blocks certain IPs, including search engines
  such as Google, anti-phishing tools such as Netcraft, and other
  network service providers. This makes the website not detectable by
  bots by returning a 404 Not Found page instead of continuing
  redirection to the phishing template. An example of the extracted IP
  based anti-detection code is shown in Figure 4.


 


 


 


  Figure 4. IP based anti-detection code


 

The next action the server takes if their IP is not banned is to
  record a log of the victims who visit the page. Code extracted shows
  that the logging includes the visitor’s IP, user-agent, operating
  system, browser, hostname and referer information, as shown in Figure 5.  


 


 


 


  Figure 5. Visitor tracking code


 

Figure 6 shows the debug log file left by the template writer.


 


 


 


  Figure 6. Debug log file


 

After logging the user information, code is executed to create a
  random md5 hash path name for the phishing page that will ultimately
  be served to the end user. After all resources are copied to the
  random path, the server redirects the visitor to this path
  (redirections 3 through 5 in Figure 3), thus rendering the actual
  phishing page in the user’s browser. The code responsible for
  generating the random path is shown in Figure 7.


 


 


 


  Figure 7. Path randomization code


 
Credential Harvesting and Final Redirection

 

At this point, the initial phishing template page shown in Figure 1
  is rendered in the user’s browser.  After entering their initial login
  credentials, the user is taken through a series of two more pages
  shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. This is to harvest address and billing information.


 


 


 


  Figure 8. Fake Address Verification Page


 


 


 


  Figure 9. Fake Billing Information Page


 

After the victim has entered all the requested information, the
  server sends an email containing the information to the attacker’s
  email address and redirects the user to the real Amazon webpage.


 

The code shown in Figure 10 is the code that builds the email
  message sent to the phisher.


 


 


 


  Figure 10. Email building code


 

The victim’s information is contained in the $message variable that
  is built from the user’s responses to the pages shown in Figure 8 and
  Figure 9.  Figure 11 shows the code that builds the message contents,
  which contains the harvested user’s information.


 


 


 


  Figure 11. Message building code


 

After the harvested credentials are emailed to the attackers, the
  user is sent a final redirection to the legitimate Amazon page. The
  code behind this redirection is shown in Figure 12.


 


 


 


  Figure 12. Final redirection


 
Conclusion

 

Detecting these types of threats can be tricky, particularly when
  the attacker is leveraging some interesting evasion techniques.
  Oftentimes users are redirected to phishing pages after clicking on a
  malicious link. FireEye recommends that users exercise caution when
  clicking on links from untrusted parties, avoid opening emails from
  unknown senders, and be wary of emails from anyone requesting
  personally identifiable information. Additionally, and most
  importantly, users should only log into Amazon by visiting the website directly.


Source: Amazon Same Day Credential Shipping

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