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SMB Exploited: WannaCry Use of "EternalBlue"

Server Message Block (SMB) is the transport protocol used by Windows
  machines for a wide variety of purposes such as file sharing, printer
  sharing, and access to remote Windows services. SMB operates over TCP
  ports 139 and 445. In April 2017, Shadow Brokers released an SMB
  vulnerability named “EternalBlue,” which was part of the     href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx">Microsoft
    security bulletin MS17-010.


 

The recent     href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2017/05/wannacry-ransomware-campaign.html">WannaCry
  ransomware takes advantage of this vulnerability to compromise
  Windows machines, load malware, and propagate to other machines in a
  network. The attack uses SMB version 1 and TCP port 445 to propagate.


 

Context


 

SMB provides support for what are known as SMB Transactions. Using
  SMB Transactions enables atomic read and write to be performed between
  an SMB client and server. If the message request is greater than the
  SMB MaxBufferSize, the remaining messages are sent as Secondary Trans2
  requests. This vulnerability affects the srv2.sys kernel driver and is
  triggered by malformed Secondary Trans2 requests.


 

Working


 

After the initial SMB handshake, which consists of a protocol
  negotiate request/response and a session setup request/response, the
  ransomware connects to the IPC$ share on the remote machine. Another
  related aspect of this attack is that the malware is configured to
  connect to a hardcoded local IP, as shown in Figure 1.


 


 
  Figure 1: Connecting to the IPC$ share


 

Next it sends out an initial NT Trans request, which is a huge
  payload size and consists of a sequence of NOPs, as shown in Figure 2.
  What it essentially does is move the SMB server state machine to a
  point where the vulnerability exists so that the attacker can then
  exploit it using a special crafted packet.


 


 
  Figure 2: Preparing server for exploit via NT Trans


 

Speaking the SMB language, the large NT Trans request leads to
  multiple Secondary Trans2 Requests to accommodate for the large
  request size. These Secondary Trans2 requests are malformed, as seen
  in the Figure 3. They act as a trigger point for the vulnerability,
  and the request data portion contains the shellcode and encrypted
  payload, which is the launcher for the malware on the remote machine.


 


 
  Figure 3: Overflow via Malformed Trans2


 

Post Exploitation & Full Cycle


 

On successfully triggering the vulnerability, an encrypted payload
  containing the stager for the malware is loaded on the remote machine.
  The payload delivered to the remote machine launches a service
  “mssecsvc” from within the lsass process. This service scans the local
  network and the internet for machines that are accessible and have
  exposed SMB ports. The service then uses the aforementioned
  vulnerability to gain access to a remote machine and deliver the
  malware payload, thus completing the full cycle. All of these
  activities happen very quickly and the attack penetrates all machines
  in a typical LAN within minutes.


 

The     href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html">ransomware
    contains two parts, the main executable file containing the code
  for scanning the network and triggering the SMB vulnerability on
  accessible machines. Within the resource section of this executable is
  another executable file embedded in a section named “R”, which
  contains the ransomware code. The executable containing the ransomware
  code has an encrypted ZIP file embedded in the resource section named
  “XIA”. The encrypted ZIP file contains encrypted keys, image files,
  Tor client and two other executables: taskdl.exe and tasse.exe. The
  ZIP file contents can be extracted using the password WNcry@2ol7
  embedded within the malware code


 

Mitigation


 

There are anomalies and patterns in the NT Trans, Trans2 requests
  and responses packets that analysts and researchers can use to create
  useful network level detection. A couple of example signatures that
  can be deployed are found   href="http://docs.emergingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/2024297">here
  and here.


Source: SMB Exploited: WannaCry Use of "EternalBlue"

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