Auteur Sujet: [FireEye]Chinese Espionage Group TEMP.Periscope Targets Cambodia Ahead of July 2018 Elections and Reveals Broad Operations Globally  (Lu 2562 fois)

0 Membres et 1 Invité sur ce sujet

Hors ligne igor51

  • Admin
  • Mega Power Members
  • *****
  • Messages: 10419
Chinese Espionage Group TEMP.Periscope Targets Cambodia Ahead of July
2018 Elections and Reveals Broad Operations Globally


[html]

Introduction


 

FireEye has examined a range of TEMP.Periscope activity revealing
  extensive interest in Cambodia's politics, with active compromises of
  multiple Cambodian entities related to the country’s electoral system.
  This includes compromises of Cambodian government entities charged
  with overseeing the elections, as well as the targeting of opposition
  figures. This campaign occurs in the run up to the country’s July 29,
  2018, general elections. TEMP.Periscope used the same infrastructure
  for a range of activity against other more traditional targets,
  including the defense industrial base in the United States and a
  chemical company based in Europe. Our previous blog post focused on
  the group’s     href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html">targeting
    of engineering and maritime entities in the United States.


 

Overall, this activity indicates that the group maintains an
  extensive intrusion architecture and wide array of malicious tools,
  and targets a large victim set, which is in line with typical
  Chinese-based APT efforts. We expect this activity to provide the
  Chinese government with widespread visibility into Cambodian elections
  and government operations. Additionally, this group is clearly able to
  run several large-scale intrusions concurrently across a wide range of
  victim types.


 

Our analysis also strengthened our overall attribution of this
  group. We observed the toolsets we previously attributed to this
  group, their observed targets are in line with past group efforts and
  also highly similar to known Chinese APT efforts, and we identified an
  IP address originating in Hainan, China that was used to remotely
  access and administer a command and control (C2) server.


 

TEMP.Periscope Background


 

Active since at least 2013, TEMP.Periscope has primarily focused on
  maritime-related targets across multiple verticals, including
  engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing,
  defense, government offices, and research universities (targeting is
  summarized in Figure 1). The group has also targeted
  professional/consulting services, high-tech industry, healthcare, and
  media/publishing. TEMP.Periscope overlaps in targeting, as well as
  tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), with TEMP.Jumper, a group
  that also overlaps significantly with public reporting by   href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets">Proofpoint
  and   href="https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf">F-Secure
  on "NanHaiShu."


 


 
 
 Figure 1: Summary of TEMP.Periscope activity


 

Incident Background


 

FireEye analyzed files on three open indexes believed to be
  controlled by TEMP.Periscope, which yielded insight into the group's
  objectives, operational tactics, and a significant amount of technical
  attribution/validation. These files were "open indexed" and
  thus accessible to anyone on the public internet. This TEMP.Periscope
  activity on these servers extends from at least April 2017 to the
  present, with the most current operations focusing on Cambodia's
  government and elections.


 
  • Two servers,
        chemscalere[.]com and scsnewstoday[.]com, operate as typical C2
        servers and hosting sites, while the third, mlcdailynews[.]com,
        functions as an active SCANBOX server. The C2 servers contained both
        logs and malware.
  • Analysis of logs from the three servers
          revealed:
    • Potential actor logins from an IP address
              located in Hainan, China that was used to remotely access and
              administer the servers, and interact with malware deployed at
              victim organizations.
    • Malware command and control
              check-ins from victim organizations in the education, aviation,
              chemical, defense, government, maritime, and technology sectors
              across multiple regions. FireEye has notified all of the victims
              that we were able to identify.
  • The malware
        present on the servers included both new families (DADBOD, EVILTECH)
        and previously identified malware families (AIRBREAK, EVILTECH,
        HOMEFRY, MURKYTOP, HTRAN, and SCANBOX) .

 


  Compromises of Cambodian Election Entities


 

Analysis of command and control logs on the servers revealed
  compromises of multiple Cambodian entities, primarily those relating
  to the upcoming July 2018 elections. In addition, a separate spear
  phishing email analyzed by FireEye indicates concurrent targeting of
  opposition figures within Cambodia by TEMP.Periscope.


 

Analysis indicated that the following Cambodian government
  organizations and individuals were compromised by TEMP.Periscope:


 
  • National Election
        Commission, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
        and International Cooperation, Cambodian Senate, Ministry of
        Economics and Finance
  • Member of Parliament representing
        Cambodia National Rescue Party
  • Multiple Cambodians
        advocating human rights and democracy who have written critically of
        the current ruling party
  • Two Cambodian diplomats serving
      overseas
  • Multiple Cambodian media entities

 

TEMP.Periscope sent a spear phish with AIRBREAK malware to
  Monovithya Kem, Deputy Director-General, Public Affairs, Cambodia
  National Rescue Party (CNRP), and the daughter of (imprisoned)
  Cambodian opposition party leader Kem Sokha (Figure 2). The decoy
  document purports to come from LICADHO (a non-governmental
  organization [NGO] in Cambodia established in 1992 to promote human
  rights). This sample leveraged scsnewstoday[.]com for C2.


 


 
 
 Figure 2: Human right protection survey lure


 

The decoy document "Interview Questions.docx" (MD5:
  ba1e5b539c3ae21c756c48a8b5281b7e) is tied to AIRBREAK downloaders of
  the same name. The questions reference the opposition Cambodian
  National Rescue Party, human rights, and the election (Figure 3).


 


 
 
 Figure 3: Interview questions decoy


 


  Infrastructure Also Used for Operations Against Private Companies


 

The aforementioned malicious infrastructure was also used against
  private companies in Asia, Europe and North America. These companies
  are in a wide range of industries, including academics, aviation,
  chemical, maritime, and technology. A MURKYTOP sample from 2017 and
  data contained in a file linked to chemscalere[.]com suggest that a
  corporation involved in the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB)
  industry, possibly related to maritime research, was compromised. Many
  of these compromises are in line with TEMP.Periscope’s previous
  activity targeting maritime and defense industries. However, we also
  uncovered the compromise of a European chemical company with a
  presence in Asia, demonstrating that this group is a threat to
  business worldwide, particularly those with ties to Asia.


 


  AIRBREAK Downloaders and Droppers Reveal Lure Indicators


 

Filenames for AIRBREAK downloaders found on the open indexed sites
  also suggest the ongoing targeting of interests associated with Asian
  geopolitics. In addition, analysis of AIRBREAK downloader sites
  revealed a related server that underscores TEMP.Periscope's interest
  in Cambodian politics.


 

The AIRBREAK downloaders in Table 1 redirect intended victims to the
  indicated sites to display a legitimate decoy document while
  downloading an AIRBREAK payload from one of the identified C2s. Of
  note, the hosting site for the legitimate documents was not
  compromised. An additional C2 domain, partyforumseasia[.]com, was
  identified as the callback for an AIRBREAK downloader referencing the
  Cambodian National Rescue Party.


 
   
     
 
   
              width="228">

en.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/8623-2018-04-26-10-12-46.html


              width="275">

TOP_NEWS_Japan_to_Support_the_Election.js


         

(3c51c89078139337c2c92e084bb0904c) [Figure 4]

        width="126" rowspan="3">

chemscalere[.]com


   
     
   
     
   
              width="275">

Interview_Questions.docx.js


       

(c8fdd2b2ddec970fa69272fdf5ee86cc)

        width="126">

scsnewstoday[.]com


   
              width="228">

atimes.com/article/philippines-draws-three-hard-new-lines-on-china/


                width="275">

Philippines-draws-three-hard-new-lines-on-china
        .js

(5d6ad552f1d1b5cfe99ddb0e2bb51fd7)

        width="126">

mlcdailynews[.]com


   
              width="228">

facebook.com/CNR.Movement/videos/190313618267633/


     
        width="126">

Partyforumseasia[.]com


Tags:
 


          Redirect Site (Not Malicious)


          AIRBREAK Downloader


          AIRBREAK C2

iric.gov.kh/LICADHO/Interview-Questions.pdf


     

[pdf]Interview-Questions.pdf.js


       

(e413b45a04bf5f812912772f4a14650f)

iric.gov.kh/LICADHO/Interview-Questions.pdf


     

[docx]Interview-Questions.docx.js


       

(cf027a4829c9364d40dcab3f14c1f6b7)

unknown

CNR.Movement.mp4.js


       

(217d40ccd91160c152e5fce0143b16ef)