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Two Limited, Targeted Attacks; Two New Zero-Days

The FireEye Labs team has identified two new zero-day vulnerabilities
  as part of limited, targeted attacks against some major corporations.
  Both zero-days exploit the Windows Kernel, with Microsoft assigning
  CVE-2014-4148 and CVE-2014-4113 to and addressing the vulnerabilities
  in their     href="https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms14-oct">October
    2014 Security Bulletin.


 

FireEye Labs have identified 16 total zero-day attacks in the last
  two years – uncovering 11 in 2013 and five in 2014 so far.


 

Microsoft commented: “On October 14, 2014, Microsoft released   href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-058.aspx">MS14-058
  to fully address these vulnerabilities and help protect customers. We
  appreciate FireEye Labs using Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure to
  assist us in working toward a fix in a collaborative manner that helps
  keep customers safe.”


 

In the case of CVE-2014-4148, the attackers exploited a
  vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows TrueType Font (TTF) processing
  subsystem, using a Microsoft Office document to embed and deliver a
  malicious TTF to an international organization. Since the embedded TTF
  is processed in kernel-mode, successful exploitation granted the
  attackers kernel-mode access. Though the TTF is delivered in a
  Microsoft Office document, the vulnerability does not reside within
  Microsoft Office.


 

CVE-2014-4148 impacted both 32-bit and 64-bit Windows operating
  systems shown in   href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-058.aspx">MS14-058,
  though the attacks only targeted 32-bit systems. The malware contained
  within the exploit has specific functions adapted to the following
  operating system platform categories:


 
  • Windows 8.1/Windows Server 2012 R2
  • Windows 8/Windows
        Server 2012
  • Windows 7/Windows Server 2008 R2 (Service Pack
        0 and 1)
  • Windows XP Service Pack 3

 

CVE-2014-4113 rendered Microsoft Windows 7, Vista, XP, Windows 2000,
  Windows Server 2003/R2, and Windows Server 2008/R2 vulnerable to a
  local Elevation of Privilege (EoP) attack. This means that the
  vulnerability cannot be used on its own to compromise a customer’s
  security. An attacker would first need to gain access to a remote
  system running any of the above operating systems before they could
  execute code within the context of the Windows Kernel. Investigation
  by FireEye Labs has revealed evidence that attackers have likely used
  variations of these exploits for a while. Windows 8 and Windows
    Server 2012 and later do not have these same vulnerabilities.


 

Information on the companies affected, as well as threat actors, is
  not available at this time. We have no evidence of these exploits
    being used by the same actors. Instead, we have only observed each
    exploit being used separately, in unrelated attacks.


 

 


 

About CVE-2014-4148


 

 


 

 


 

Mitigation


 

 


 

Microsoft has released security update   href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-058.aspx">MS14-058
  that addresses CVE-2014-4148.


 

Since TTF exploits target the underlying operating system, the
  vulnerability can be exploited through multiple attack vectors,
  including web pages. In the past, exploit kit authors have converted a
  similar exploit (CVE-2011-3402) for use in browser-based attacks. More
  information about this scenario is available under     href="http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2011/12/13/more-information-on-ms11-087.aspx">Microsoft’s
    response to CVE-2011-3402: MS11-087.


 

 


 

Details


 

 


 

This TTF exploit is packaged within a Microsoft Office file. Upon
  opening the file, the font will exploit a vulnerability in the Windows
  TTF subsystem located within the win32k.sys kernel-mode driver.


 

The attacker’s shellcode resides within the Font Program (fpgm)
  section of the TTF. The font program begins with a short sequence of
  instructions that quickly return. The remainder of the font program
  section is treated as unreachable code for the purposes of the font
  program and is ignored when initially parsing the font.


 

During exploitation, the attacker’s shellcode uses Asynchronous
  Procedure Calls (APC) to inject the second stage from kernel-mode into
  the user-mode process winlogon.exe (in XP) or lsass.exe (in other
  OSes). From the injected process, the attacker writes and executes a
  third stage (executable).


 

The third stage decodes an embedded DLL to, and runs it from,
  memory. This DLL is a full-featured remote access tool that connects
  back to the attacker.


 

Plenty of evidence supports the attacker’s high level of
  sophistication. Beyond the fact that the attack is zero-day
  kernel-level exploit, the attack also showed the following:


 
  • a usable hard-coded area of kernel memory is used like a mutex
        to avoid running the shellcode multiple times
  • the exploit
        has an expiration date: if the current time is after October 31,
        2014, the exploit shellcode will exit silently
  • the
        shellcode has implementation customizations for four different types
        of OS platforms/service pack levels, suggesting that testing for
        multiple OS platforms was conducted
  • the dropped malware
        individually decodes each string when that string is used to prevent
      analysis
  • the dropped malware is specifically customized for
        the targeted environment
  • the dropped remote access
        capability is full-featured and customized: it does not rely on
        generally available implementations (like Poison Ivy)
  • the
        dropped remote access capability is a loader that decrypts the
        actual DLL remote access capability into memory and never writes the
        decrypted remote access capability to disk

 

 


 

About CVE-2014-4113


 

 


 

 


 

Mitigation


 

 


 

Microsoft has released security update   href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-058.aspx">MS14-058
  that addresses this vulnerability.


 

 


 

Vulnerability and Exploit Details


 

 


 

The 32-bit exploit triggers an out-of-bounds memory access that
  dereferences offsets from a high memory address, and inadvertently
  wraps into the null page. In user-mode, memory dereferences within the
  null page are generally assumed to be non-exploitable. Since the null
  page is usually not mapped – the exception being 16-bit legacy
  applications emulated by ntvdm.exe--null pointer dereferences will
  simply crash the running process. In contrast, memory dereferences
  within the null page in the kernel are commonly exploited because the
  attacker can first map the null page from user-mode, as is the case
  with this exploits. The steps taken for successful 32-bit exploitation are:


 

 


 

     

  1. Map the null page:

     

     

       


             
    1. ntdll!ZwAllocateVirtualMemory(…,BaseAddress=0x1, …)

    2.      

       

     

     

  2. Build a malformed
        win32k!tagWND structure at the null page such that it is properly
        validated in the kernel
  3. Trigger vulnerability

  4.    
  5. Attacker’s callback in win32k!tagWND.lpfnWndProc executes in
        kernel-mode

     

     

       

    1. Callback overwrites
              EPROCESS.Token to elevate privileges
    2.  


       

     

     

  6. Spawns a child process that inherits the
        elevated access token
  7.  


 

 


 


  32-bit Windows 8 and later users are not affected by this
  exploit.
The Windows 8 Null Page protection prohibits user-mode
  processes from mapping the null page and causes the exploits to fail.


 

In the 64-bit version of the exploit, dereferencing offsets from a
  high 32-bit memory address do not wrap, as it is well within the
  addressable memory range for a 64-bit user-mode process. As such, the
  Null Page protection implemented in Windows versions 7 (after
  MS13-031) and later does not apply. The steps taken by the 64-bit
  exploit variants are:


 

 


 

     

  1. Map memory page:

     

     

       


           
    1. ntdll!ZwAllocateVirtualMemory(…)
    2.  

     


       

     

  2. Build a malformed win32k!tagWND structure at the
        mapped page such that it is properly validated in the kernel

  3.    
  4. Trigger vulnerability
  5. Attacker’s callback in
        win32k!tagWND.lpfnWndProc executes in kernel-mode

     

     


         

       

    1. Callback overwrites EPROCESS.Token to elevate
            privileges
    2.  

     

     

  6. Spawns
        a child process that inherits the elevated access token

  7.  

     


 

 


 


  64-bit Windows 8 and later users are not affected by this
  exploit.
Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) blocks the
  attacker’s user-mode callback from executing within kernel-mode and
  causes the exploits to fail.


 

 


 

Exploits Tool History


 

 


 

The exploits are implemented as a command line tool that accepts a
  single command line argument – a shell command to execute with SYSTEM
  privileges. This tool appears to be an updated version of an earlier
  tool. The earlier tool exploited CVE-2011-1249, and displays the
  following usage message to stdout when run:


 

 


 

Usage:system_exp.exe cmd

 

 


 

 


 

Windows Kernel Local Privilege Exploits

 

 


 

The vast majority of samples of the earlier tool have compile dates
  in December 2009.  Only two samples were discovered with compile dates
  in March 2011. Although the two samples exploit the same CVE, they
  carry a slightly modified usage message of:


 

 


 

Usage:local.exe cmd

 

 


 

 


 

Windows local Exploits

 

 


 

The most recent version of the tool, which implements CVE-2014-4113,
  eliminates all usage messages.


 

The tool appears to have gone through at least three iterations over
  time. The initial tool and exploits is believed to have had limited
  availability, and may have been employed by a handful of distinct
  attack groups. As the exploited vulnerability was remediated, someone
  with access to the tool modified it to use a newer exploit when one
  became available. These two newer versions likely did not achieve the
  widespread distribution that the original tool/exploits did and may
  have been retained privately, not necessarily even by the same actors.


 

We would like to thank Barry Vengerik, Joshua Homan, Steve Davis,
  Ned Moran, Corbin Souffrant, Xiaobo Chen for their assistance on this research.


Source: Two Limited, Targeted Attacks; Two New Zero-Days

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