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Second Adobe Flash Zero-Day CVE-2015-5122 from HackingTeam Exploited in
Strategic Web Compromise Targeting Japanese Victims


On July 14, FireEye researchers discovered attacks exploiting the
  Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-5122, just four days after Adobe
  released a patch. CVE-2015-5122 was the second Adobe Flash zero-day
  revealed in the leak of HackingTeam’s internal data. The campaign
  targeted Japanese organizations by using at least two legitimate
  Japanese websites to host a strategic web compromise (SWC), where
  victims ultimately downloaded a variant of the SOGU malware.


 


  Strategic Web Compromise


 

At least two different Japanese websites were compromised to host
  the exploit framework and malicious downloads:


 
  • Japan’s International Hospitality and Conference Service
        Association (IHCSA) website (hxxp://www.ihcsa[.]or[.]jp) in Figure
      1

 


 


 

    Figure 1: IHCSA website


 
  • Japan’s Cosmetech Inc. website
      (hxxp://cosmetech[.]co[.]jp)

 

The main landing page for the attacks is a specific URL seeded on
  the IHCSA website
  (hxxp://www.ihcsa[.]or[.]jp/zaigaikoukan/zaigaikoukansencho-1/), where
  users are redirected to the HackingTeam Adobe Flash framework hosted
  on the second compromised Japanese website. We observed in the past
  week this same basic framework across several different SWCs
  exploiting the “older” CVE-2015-5119 Adobe Flash vulnerability in
  Figure 2.


 


 


 

    Figure 2: First portion of exploit chain


 

The webpage (hxxp://cosmetech[.]co[.]jp/css/movie.html) is built
  with the open source framework Adobe Flex and checks if the user has
  at least Adobe Flash Player version 11.4.0 installed. If the victim
  has the correct version of Flash, the user is directed to run a
  different, more in-depth profiling script
  (hxxp://cosmetech.co.jp/css/swfobject.js), which checks for several
  more conditions in addition to their version of Flash. If the
  conditions are not met then the script will not attempt to load the
  Adobe Flash (SWF) file into the user’s browser. In at least two of the
  incidents we observed, the victims were running Internet Explorer 11
  on Windows 7 machines.


 

The final component is delivering a malicious SWF file, which we
  confirmed exploits CVE-2015-5122 on Adobe Version 18.0.0.203 for
  Windows in Figure 3.


 


 


 

    Figure 3: Malicious SWF download


 

SOGU Malware, Possible New Variant


 

After successful exploitation, the SWF file dropped a SOGU variant—a
  backdoor widely used by Chinese threat groups and also known as
  “Kaba”—in a temporary directory under “AppData\Local\”. The directory
  contains the properties and configuration in Figure 4.


 

    Filename: Rdws.exe


 

    Size: 413696 bytes


 

    MD5: 5a22e5aee4da2fe363b77f1351265a00


 

    Compile Time: 2015-07-13 08:11:01


 

    SHA256: df5f1b802d553cddd3b99d1901a87d0d1f42431b366cfb0ed25f465285e38d27


 

   
  SSDeep:6144:Na/PSOE9OPXCQpA3abFUntBrDP3FVPsCE2NiYfFei78GlGeYO:IPSOE9OPXCQ
     pAK5YBvPPPrZVkiY2Y


 

    Import Hash: ae984e4ab41d192d631d4f923d9210e4


 

    PEHash: 57e6b26eac0f34714252957d26287bc93ef07db2


 

    .text: e683e1f9fb674f97cf4420d15dc09a2b


 

    .rdata: 3a92b98a74d7ffb095fe70cf8acacc75


 

    .data: b5d4f68badfd6e3454f8ad29da54481f


 

    .rsrc: 474f9723420a3f2d0512b99932a50ca7


 

    C2 Password: gogogod<


 

    Memo: 201507122359


 

    Process Inject Targets: %windir%\system32\svchost.exe


 

    Sogu Config Encoder: sogu_20140307


 

    Mutex Name: ZucFCoeHa8KvZcj1FO838HN&*wz4xSdmm1


 

    Figure 4: SOGU Binary ‘Rdws.exe’


 

The compile timestamp indicates the malware was assembled on July
  13, less than a day before we observed the SWC. We believe the time
  stamp in this case is likely genuine, based on the time line of the
  incident. The SOGU binary also appears to masquerade as a legitimate
  Trend Micro file named “VizorHtmlDialog.exe” in Figure 5.


 

    LegalCopyright: Copyright (C) 2009-2010 Trend Micro
  Incorporated. All rights reserved.


 

    InternalName: VizorHtmlDialog


 

    FileVersion: 3.0.0.1303


 

    CompanyName: Trend Micro Inc.


 

    PrivateBuild: Build 1303 - 8/8/2010


 

    LegalTrademarks: Trend Micro Titanium is a registered trademark
  of Trend Micro Incorporated.


 

    Comments:


 

    ProductName: Trend Micro Titanium


 

    SpecialBuild: 1303


 

    ProductVersion: 3.0


 

    FileDescription: Trend Titanium


 

    OriginalFilename: VizorHtmlDialog.exe


 

    Figure 5: Rdws.exe version information


 

The threat group likely used Trend Micro, a security software
  company headquartered in Japan, as the basis for the fake file version
  information deliberately, given the focus of this campaign on Japanese organizations.


 

SOGU Command and Control


 

The SOGU variant calls out to a previously unobserved command and
  control (CnC) domain, “amxil[.]opmuert[.]org” over port 443 in Figure
  6. It uses modified DNS TXT record beaconing with an encoding we have
  not previously observed with SOGU malware, along with a non-standard
  header, indicating that this is possibly a new variant.


 


 


 

    Figure 6: SOGU C2 beaconing


 

The WHOIS registrant email address for the domain did not indicate
  any prior malicious activity, and the current IP resolution
  (54.169.89.240) is for an Amazon Web Services IP address.


 

  Another Quick Turnaround on Leveraging HackingTeam Zero-Days

 

Similar to the short turnaround time highlighted in our blog on the
  recent     href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html">APT3/APT18
    phishing attacks, the threat actor quickly employed the leaked
  zero-day vulnerability into a SWC campaign. The threat group appears
  to have used procured and compromised infrastructure to target
  Japanese organizations. In two days we have observed at least two
  victims related to this attack.


 

We cannot confirm how the organizations were targeted, though
  similar incidents involving SWC and exploitation of the Flash
  vulnerability CVE-2015-5119 lured victims with phishing emails.
  Additionally, the limited popularity of the niche site also
  contributes to our suspicion that phishing emails may have been the
  lure, and not incidental web browsing.


 
Malware Overlap with Other Chinese Threat Groups

 

We believe that this is a concerted campaign against Japanese
  companies given the nature of the SWC. The use of SOGU malware and
  dissemination method is consistent with the tactics of Chinese APT
  groups that we track. Chinese APT groups have previously targeted the
  affected Japanese organizations, but we have yet to confirm which
  group is responsible for this campaign.


 
Why Japan?

 

In this case, we do not have enough information to discern
  specifically what the threat actors may have been pursuing. The
  Japanese economy’s technological innovation and strengths in high-tech
  and precision goods have attracted the interest of multiple Chinese
  APT groups, who almost certainly view Japanese companies as a rich
  source of intellectual property and competitive intelligence. The
  Japanese government and military organizations are also frequent
  targets of cyber espionage.[1]  Japan’s economic influence, alliance
  with the United States, regional disputes, and evolving defense
  policies make the Japanese government a dedicated target of foreign intelligence.


 

  Recommendations

 

FireEye maintains endpoint and network detection for CVE-2015-5122
  and the backdoor used in this campaign. FireEye products and services
  identify this activity as SOGU/Kaba within the user interface.
  Additionally, we highly recommend:


 
  • Applying       href="https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa15-04.html">Adobe’s
          newest patch for Flash immediately;
  • Querying for
        additional activity by the indicators from the compromised Japanese
        websites and the SOGU malware callbacks;
  • Blocking CnC
        addresses via outbound communications; and
  • Scope the
        environment to prepare for incident response.
     

     

    [1]
          Humber, Yuriy and Gearoid Reidy. “Yahoo Hacks Highlight Cyber
          Flaws Japan Rushing to Twart.” BloombergBusiness. 8 July 2014.     href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-08/yahoo-hacks-highlight-cyber-flaws-japan-rushing-to-thwart">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-08/yahoo-hacks-highlight-cyber-flaws-japan-rushing-to-thwart


         

    Japanese Ministry of Defense. “Trends Concerning Cyber Space.”
          Defense of Japan 2014. 
        http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_1-2-5_web_1031.pdf


         

    LAC Corporation. “Cyber Grid View, Vol. 1.”
        http://www.lac.co.jp/security/report/pdf/apt_report_vol1_en.pdf


         

    Otake, Tomoko. “Japan Pension Service hack used classic attack
          method.” Japan Times. 2 June 2015.
        http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/02/national/social-issues/japan-pension-service-hack-used-classic-attack-method/


       

     


Source: Second Adobe Flash Zero-Day CVE-2015-5122 from HackingTeam Exploited in
Strategic Web Compromise Targeting Japanese Victims

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