Auteur Sujet: [FireEye]Occupy Your Icons Silently on Android  (Lu 2976 fois)

0 Membres et 1 Invité sur ce sujet

Hors ligne igor51

  • Admin
  • Mega Power Members
  • *****
  • Messages: 10419
[FireEye]Occupy Your Icons Silently on Android
« le: février 10, 2018, 14:00:20 »
Occupy Your Icons Silently on Android

FireEye mobile security researchers have discovered a new Android
  security issue: a malicious app with normal protection level
  permissions can probe icons on Android home screen and modify them to
  point to phishing websites or the malicious app itself without
  notifying the user. Google has acknowledged this issue and released
  the patch to its OEM partners.




  Normal vs. Dangerous Permissions: A Background



Android Open Source Project (AOSP) classifies Android permissions
  into several protection levels: “normal”, “dangerous”, “system”,
  “signature” and “development” [    href="http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element.html">1][    href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/master/core/res">2][3].


Dangerous permissions “may be displayed to the user and require
  confirmation before proceeding, or some other approach may be taken to
  avoid the user automatically allowing the use of such facilities”. In
  contrast, normal permissions are automatically granted at
  installation,  “without asking for the user's explicit approval
  (though the user always has the option to review these permissions
  before installing)” [1].



On the latest Android 4.4.2 system, if an
  app requests both dangerous permissions and normal permissions,
  Android only displays the dangerous permissions, as shown in Figure 1.
  If an app requests only normal permissions, Android doesn’t display
  them to the user, as shown in Figure 2.



        class=" wp-image-5156         aligncenter portrait-sm"
      style="border: 0.0px none;"
      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/04/and1.png"
      width="344" height="550" />



  Figure 1. An Android app asks for one dangerous permission
  (INTERNET) and some normal permissions (Launcher’s
  READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS). Android doesn’t
  notify the user about the normal permissions.



        class=" wp-image-5157  aligncenter portrait-sm"
      src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2014/04/and2.png"
      width="343" height="549" />



  Figure 2. An Android app asks for normal permissions
  (Launcher’s READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS) only.
  Android doesn’t show any permission to the user.




  Normal Permissions Can Be Dangerous





 


 

We have found that certain “normal”
    permissions have dangerous security impacts. Using these normal
    permissions, a malicious app can replace legit Android home screen
    icons with fake ones that point to phishing apps or websites.


 

The ability to manipulate Android home
    screen icons, when abused, can help an attacker deceive the user.
    There’s no surprise that the
    com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT
    permission, which allows an app to create icons, was recategorized
    from “normal” to “dangerous” ever since Android 4.2. Though this is
    an important security improvement, an attacker can still manipulate
    Android home screen icons using two normal permissions:
    com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS and
    com.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS. These two
    permissions enable an app to query, insert, delete, or modify the
    whole configuration settings of the Launcher, including the icon
    insertion or modification. Unfortunately, these two permissions have
    been labeled as “normal” since Android 1.x.


 

As a proof of concept attack scenario, a
    malicious app with these two permissions can query/insert/alter the
    system icon settings and modify legitimate icons of some
    security-sensitive apps, such as banking apps, to a phishing
    website. We tested and confirmed this attack on a Nexus 7 device
    with Android 4.4.2. (Note: The testing website was brought down
    quickly and nobody else ever connected to it.) Google Play doesn’t
    prevent this app from being published and there’s no warning when a
    user downloads and installs it. (Note: We have removed the app from
    Google Play quickly and nobody else downloaded this app.)


 

Lastly, this vulnerability is not limited
    to Android devices running AOSP. We have also examined devices that
    use non-AOSP Launchers, including Nexus 7 with CyanogenMod 4.4.2,
    Samsung Galaxy S4 with Android 4.3 and HTC One with Android 4.4.2.
    All of them have the protection levels of
    com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS and
    WRITE_SETTINGS as “normal”.


 

Google acknowledged this vulnerability
    and has released the patch to its OEM partners. Many android vendors
    were slow to adapt security upgrades. We urge these vendors to patch
    vulnerabilities more quickly to protect their users.


 


    References:


 


   


     


  1.  


     

        http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element.html

     


     


     


  2.  


     

        https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/master/core/res/AndroidManifest.xml

     


     


       


  3.  


     

        https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Launcher2/+/master/AndroidManifest.xml

     


     


     


     



    Source: Occupy Your Icons Silently on Android

    Tags: