Posté par: igor51 le août 07, 2019, 16:00:20
Today, FireEye Intelligence is releasing a comprehensive report
detailing APT41, a prolific Chinese cyber threat group that carries
out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel with financially
motivated operations. APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors
in that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for
espionage campaigns in what appears to be activity for personal gain.
Explicit financially-motivated targeting is unusual among Chinese
state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests APT41 has
conducted simultaneous cyber crime and cyber espionage operations from
2014 onward.
The full
published report covers historical and ongoing activity
attributed to APT41, the evolution of the group’s tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs), information on the individual actors, an
overview of their malware toolset, and how these identifiers overlap
with other known Chinese espionage operators. APT41 partially
coincides with public reporting on groups including BARIUM (
and Winnti (
Clearsky).
Who Does APT41 Target?
Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 espionage targeting
has generally aligned with
Five-Year economic development plans. The group has established
and maintained strategic access to organizations in the healthcare,
high-tech, and telecommunications sectors. APT41 operations against
higher education, travel services, and news/media firms provide some
indication that the group also tracks individuals and conducts
surveillance. For example, the group has repeatedly targeted call
record information at telecom companies. In another instance, APT41
targeted a hotel’s reservation systems ahead of Chinese officials
staying there, suggesting the group was tasked to reconnoiter the
facility for security reasons.
The group’s financially motivated activity has primarily focused on
the video game industry, where APT41 has manipulated virtual
currencies and even attempted to deploy ransomware. The group is adept
at moving laterally within targeted networks, including pivoting
between Windows and Linux systems, until it can access game production
environments. From there, the group steals source code as well as
digital certificates which are then used to sign malware. More
importantly, APT41 is known to use its access to production
environments to inject malicious code into legitimate files which are
later distributed to victim organizations. These supply chain
compromise tactics have also been characteristic of APT41’s best known
and most recent espionage campaigns.
Interestingly, despite the significant effort required to execute
supply chain compromises and the large number of affected
organizations, APT41 limits the deployment of follow-on malware to
specific victim systems by matching against individual system
identifiers. These multi-stage operations restrict malware delivery
only to intended victims and significantly obfuscate the intended
targets. In contrast, a typical spear-phishing campaign’s desired
targeting can be discerned based on recipients' email addresses.
A breakdown of industries directly targeted by APT41 over time can
be found in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timeline of industries directly
targeted by APT41
Probable Chinese Espionage Contractors
Two identified personas using the monikers “Zhang Xuguang” and
“Wolfzhi” linked to APT41 operations have also been identified in
Chinese-language forums. These individuals advertised their skills and
services and indicated that they could be hired. Zhang listed his
online hours as 4:00pm to 6:00am, similar to APT41 operational times
against online gaming targets and suggesting that he is moonlighting.
Mapping the group’s activities since 2012 (Figure 2) also provides
some indication that APT41 primarily conducts financially motivated
operations outside of their normal day jobs.
Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified persona
information, their previous work and apparent expertise in programming
skills, and their targeting of Chinese market-specific online
games. The latter is especially notable because APT41 has repeatedly
returned to targeting the video game industry and we believe these
activities were formative in the group’s later espionage operations.
Figure 2: Operational activity for gaming
versus non-gaming-related targeting based on observed operations
since 2012
The Right Tool for the Job
APT41 leverages an arsenal of over 46 different malware families and
tools to accomplish their missions, including publicly available
utilities, malware shared with other Chinese espionage operations, and
tools unique to the group. The group often relies on spear-phishing
emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to
initially compromise their victims. Once in a victim organization,
APT41 can leverage more sophisticated TTPs and deploy additional
malware. For example, in a campaign running almost a year, APT41
compromised hundreds of systems and used close to 150 unique pieces of
malware including backdoors, credential stealers, keyloggers, and rootkits.
APT41 has also deployed rootkits and Master Boot Record (MBR)
bootkits on a limited basis to hide their malware and maintain
persistence on select victim systems. The use of bootkits in
particular adds an extra layer of stealth because the code is executed
prior to the operating system initializing. The limited use of these
tools by APT41 suggests the group reserves more advanced TTPs and
malware only for high-value targets.
Fast and Relentless
APT41 quickly identifies and compromises intermediary systems that
provide access to otherwise segmented parts of an organization’s
network. In one case, the group compromised hundreds of systems across
multiple network segments and several geographic regions in as little
as two weeks.
The group is also highly agile and persistent, responding quickly to
changes in victim environments and incident responder activity. Hours
after a victimized organization made changes to thwart APT41, for
example, the group compiled a new version of a backdoor using a
freshly registered command-and-control domain and compromised several
systems across multiple geographic regions. In a different instance,
APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to multiple HR employees three days
after an intrusion had been remediated and systems were brought back
online. Within hours of a user opening a malicious attachment sent by
APT41, the group had regained a foothold within the organization's
servers across multiple geographic regions.
Looking Ahead
APT41 is a creative, skilled, and well-resourced adversary, as
highlighted by the operation’s distinct use of supply chain
compromises to target select individuals, consistent signing of
malware using compromised digital certificates, and deployment of
bootkits (which is rare among Chinese APT groups).
Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 appears to have moved
toward strategic intelligence collection and establishing access and
away from direct intellectual property theft since 2015. This shift,
however, has not affected the group's consistent interest in targeting
the video game industry for financially motivated reasons. The group's
capabilities and targeting have both broadened over time, signaling
the potential for additional supply chain compromises affecting a
variety of victims in additional verticals.
APT41's links to both underground marketplaces and state-sponsored
activity may indicate the group enjoys protections that enables it to
conduct its own for-profit activities, or authorities are willing to
overlook them. It is also possible that APT41 has simply evaded
scrutiny from Chinese authorities. Regardless, these operations
underscore a blurred line between state power and crime that lies at
the heart of threat ecosystems and is exemplified by APT41.
Source: APT41: A Dual Espionage and Cyber Crime Operation (http://)