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Poison Ivy: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence

Today, our research team is publishing a   href="/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf">report
  on the Poison Ivy family of remote access tools (RATs) along with a
  package of tools created to work as a balm of sorts — naturally, we’re
  calling the package “Calamine.”


 

In an era of sophisticated cyber attacks, you might wonder why we’re
  even bothering with this well-known, downright ancient pest. As we
  explain in the paper, dismissing Poison Ivy could be a costly mistake.


 

RATs may well be the hacker’s equivalent of training wheels, as they
  are often regarded in IT security circles. But despite their
  reputation as a software toy for novice “script kiddies,” RATs remain
  a linchpin of many sophisticated cyber attacks and are used by
  numerous threat actors.


 

Requiring little technical savvy, RATs offer unfettered access to
  compromised machines. They are deceptively simple — attackers can
  point and click their way through the target’s network to steal data
  and intellectual property. But they are often delivered as a key
  component of coordinated attacks that use previously unknown
  (zero-day) software flaws and clever social engineering.


 

Even as security professionals shrug off the threat, the presence of
  a RAT may in itself indicate a targeted attack known as an advanced
  persistent threat (APT). Unlike malware focused on opportunistic
  cybercrime (typically conducted by botnets of compromised machines),
  RATs require a live person on the other side of the attack.


 

Poison Ivy has been used in several high-profile malware campaigns,
  most infamously, the 2011 compromise of RSA SecurID data. The same
  year, Poison Ivy powered a coordinated attack dubbed “Nitro” against
  chemical makers, government offices, defense firms, and human-rights groups.


 

 

   

We have discovered several nation-state threat actors actively
      using Poison Ivy, including the following:


 
  • admin@338 — Active since 2008, this actor mostly targets the
        financial services industry, though we have also seen activity in
        the telecom, government, and defense sectors.
  • th3bug —
        First detected in 2009, this actor targets a number of industries,
        primarily higher education and healthcare.
  • menuPass — Also
        first detected in 2009, this actor targets U.S. and overseas defense
      contractors.

 

Understanding why Poison Ivy remains one of the most widely used
  RATs is easy. Controlled through a familiar Windows interface, it
  offers a bevy of handy features: key logging, screen capture, video
  capturing, file transfers, password theft, system administration,
  traffic relaying, and more.


 

Here is how a typical Poison Ivy attack works:


 
  1. The attacker sets up a custom PIVY server, tailoring details
        such as how Poison Ivy will install itself on the target computer,
        what features are enabled, the encryption password, and so on.

  2.    
  3. The attacker sends the PIVY server installation file to the
        targeted computer. Typically, the attacker takes advantage of a
        zero-day flaw. The target executes the file by opening an infected
        email attachment, for example, or visiting a compromised
      website.
  4. The server installation file begins executing on the
        target machine. To avoid detection by anti-virus software, it
        downloads additional code as needed through an encrypted
        communication channel.
  5. Once the PIVY server is up and
        running on the target machine, the attacker uses a Windows GUI
        client to control the target computer.

 

Poison Ivy is so widely used that security professionals have a
  harder time tracing attacks that use the RAT to any particular attacker.


 

 

We hope to eliminate some of that anonymity with the Calamine
    package. The package, which enables organizations to easily monitor
    Poison Ivy’s behavior and communications, includes these
  components:

  • PIVY callback-decoding tool (ChopShop module,
          available here:     href="https://github.com/fireeye/chopshop">https://github.com/fireeye/chopshop)

  •      
  • PIVY memory-decoding tool  (PIVY PyCommand script, available
            here:     href="https://github.com/fireeye/pycommands">https://github.com/fireeye/pycommands)

  •  

ChopShop[1] is a new framework developed by the MITRE
    Corporation for network-based protocol decoders that enable security
    professionals to understand actual commands issued by human
    operators controlling endpoints. The FireEye PIVY module for
    ChopShop decrypts Poison Ivy network traffic.

PyCommands,
    meanwhile, are Python scripts that automate tasks for Immunity
    Debugger, a popular tool for reverse-engineering malware
    binaries.[2] The FireEye PyCommand script dumps configuration
    information from a running PIVY process on an infected endpoint,
    which can provide additional telemetry about the threat actor behind
    the attack.

FireEye is sharing the Calamine tools with the
    security community at large under the BSD 2-Clause license[3] for
    both commercial and non-commercial use worldwide.

By tracking
    the PIVY server activity, security professionals can find these
    telltale indicators:


 
  • The domains and IPs used for CnC
  • The attacker’s PIVY
        process mutex
  • The attacker’s PIVY password
  • The
        launcher code used in the malware droppers
  • A timeline of
        malware activity

 

The FireEye report explains how Calamine can connect these and other
  facets of the attack. This evidence is especially useful when it is
  correlated with multiple attacks that display the same identifying
  features. Combining these nitty-gritty details with big-picture
  intelligence can help profile threat attackers and enhance IT defenses.


 

Calamine may not stop determined APT actors from using Poison Ivy.
  But it can complicate their ability to hide behind this commodity RAT.


 

Full details are available, here:


 

  •    
                  href="/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf">White
      Paper

  •     Appendix -
        Includes full technical indicators of compromise (IOCs)

  •           target="_blank">Calamine Package - For analyzing PIVY process
        and network artifacts. The tools leverage       href="http://debugger.immunityinc.com/" target="_blank">Immunity
        Debugger and MITRE's       href="http://www.mitre.org/work/cybersecurity/blog/cyber_tools_shields4.html"
      target="_blank">ChopShop.

 


  [1] ChopShop is available for download at https://github.com/MITRECND/chopshop.


 

 


    [2] Immunity Debugger is available at   href="http://debugger.immunityinc.com/">http://debugger.immunityinc.com/.


 

  [3] For more information about the BSD 2-Clause License, see
  the Open Source Initiative’s template at   href="http://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause">http://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause.
  

Source: Poison Ivy: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence

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